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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of entrepreneurship is widely discussed in the literature because it is usually closely 
related to a number of urgent issues including economic growth. In particular, several 
endogenous growth models were presented where a level of entrepreneurial activities was 
defined as a key component of economic growth (King & Levine, 1993). Wennekers and Thurik 
(1999) emphasised not only the role of entrepreneurship in the economic growth but also 
highlighted it as an important factor in the context of social policies such as a measure for 
reducing unemployment. However, an effect of entrepreneurship on economic growth remains 
ambiguous and no consensus has been achieved. In particular, Acs and Szerb (2007) argue that 
an importance of entrepreneurship for the country is highly dependent on the public policy 
conditions. Carree and Thurik (2003) emphasised also that consideration of entrepreneurship 
without fundamental understanding of underlying incentives to open a business might be a 
misleading link to the issue of economic growth. Wong, Ho and Autio (2005) considered 
entrepreneurship through an innovation process in line with the theory of Schumpeter. It is 
argued that a connection between economic growth and entrepreneurship remains ambiguous as 
it is dependent on whether the entrepreneurs actually support the innovation process or just 
balance demand and supply in the case of market disequilibrium. As it can be seen from the 
literature discussed here, there is no clear consensus whether entrepreneurship should be 
considered as a prerequisite for economic growth. However, it can be argued that it is an 
important factor that cannot be neglected. Furthermore, the issue of entrepreneurship is 
important not only from the perspectives of economic growth but also from the perspectives of 
social policy.  
This thesis will be focused on aggregate entrepreneurial activities which are considered as a 
process of creating vacancies. However, the main theme of the paper is not linked to the 
consequences but rather to the determinants of its existence. In particular, a literature review 
presented in the next section identifies an existing gap which relates to an absence of a 
systematic theoretical framework that can match the empirical evidence. In particular, it is 
hypothesised that this is quality of government which plays an important role. To be more 
precise, an ambiguous effect of such factors as liquidity constraints and taxation is believed to be 
explained by the varying government effectiveness which, in turn, affects collection of taxes and 
provision of public goods, thus altering expected profitability of the entrepreneurs and the 
workers on the labour market. It seems also important to mention that this thesis will treat such 
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terms as government effectiveness, institutional quality and quality of government as „full‟ 
synonyms. 
According to the purpose of the research and in line with the works that are chosen as a 
benchmark for obtaining theoretical results, the entrepreneurship is considered as an 
indispensible part of the labour market. To be more precise, it is believed that an individual 
chooses to be an entrepreneur only if expected profitability with respect to personal initial 
conditions (entrepreneurial ability and initial wealth) is higher than expected profit that would 
have been earned if employment as a worker was chosen. It seems important to note, however, 
that theoretical and empirical analysis conducted within this paper is connected based on the 
assumption that a number of entrepreneurs changes with the same tendency as a number of 
vacancies created. In other words, it is assumed that a number of entrepreneurs is not the same as 
a number of vacancies created in the model but these parameters moves together since more 
individuals choose entrepreneurial path, the more vacancies are created in the economy. 
Therefore, it can be said that a number of created vacancies plays a role of a proxy for a level of 
entrepreneurial activities within the scopes of further theoretical analysis in this paper. Such an 
assumption provides a connection between theoretical and empirical parts of the research. In 
particular, the theoretical part considers creation of vacancies in the economy which is dependent 
on how many individuals find it profitable to become an entrepreneur compared to being a 
worker, based on their entrepreneurial ability, initial wealth and economic conditions to be 
discussed further, whereas the empirical part focuses on a number of entrepreneurs in the 
economy based on data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys. Therefore, 
theoretical and empirical parts complement each other according to the purpose of the research. 
To sum up, this paper is expected to enrich understanding of factors and mechanisms underlying 
a particular level of aggregate entrepreneurial activities within the economy. In particular, the 
urgency of the research is justified by the absence of a theoretical model which is supported by 
empirical evidence, and can capture systematic features of the labour market while taking into 
consideration the government as an indivisible agent, which affects the economic environment 
through tax collection and public expenditures. As a result of the thesis completion, the 
following research question will be answered: does government effectiveness play an important 
role in the economic environment in which a level of aggregate entrepreneurial activities is 
endogenously determined. In addition, empirical analysis using an econometric model will be 
conducted in order to assess the extent to which the theoretical model captures the reality. 
According to the purpose of the research, the structure of the paper will be as follows: the second 
chapter provides a brief literature review that helps to identify the research gap; the third section 
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describes theoretical results of the extended model which was based on the model by Kolakez 
and Legmann (2010). The chapter four attempts to provide empirical analysis based on the 
results of the theoretical model in order to assess whether empirical evidence actually matches 
the theoretical conclusions. The fifth chapter discusses a contribution to the existing literature 
that stems from the results obtained in this paper and emphasises weaknesses of the research, 
which also leave the scopes for the future research in this field. The final section concludes. 
 6 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As the introduction to this thesis suggests, entrepreneurship was widely discussed as a complex 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is believed that further contribution to the literature is required, 
based on the identified gap in the literature. Therefore, before proceeding to the analysis and the 
discussion of the literature particularly related to the issue aimed to be addressed within this 
research, it seems worth to start off with a definition of entrepreneurship. Many research fields 
such as economics, psychology, business studies, sociology, etc., considered entrepreneurship as 
a social phenomenon. However, there is no consensus in the literature with regard to the 
questions of how entrepreneurship should be defined, which resulted in existence of a number of 
proposed definitions. Therefore, some of them will be considered in this section below. 
The literature which considers different aspects of existence of entrepreneurship might be 
stratified as economic and organisational approaches (Storey & Greene, 2010). Within the 
former approach a number of key components are emphasised. Most of the works within this 
branch of literature agree on importance of arbitrage
1
 in terms of imperfect information on the 
market. Knight (1921) considered willingness to decision making under uncertainty as a main 
attribute of entrepreneurs. Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) emphasised a risk-loving nature of 
entrepreneurs which is a source of profit in terms of risk-premium. It is also an opinion that due 
to particular personal qualities required to run a business, only a fixed share of population can 
profitably play this role (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998). A widely discussed theory of 
Schumpeter (1934) and Schumpeter (1942) emphasised an innovative nature of entrepreneurs 
who push the system out of the market equilibrium. In contrast, Kirzner (1973) supports a view 
that this is disequilibrium on the market which provides the scopes for entrepreneurial activities. 
Finally, operation of scarce resources in order to create value is widely considered as the main 
feature of entrepreneurship. 
The organisational approach has resulted in existence of several definitions of entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship is a process of innovation and creation of new ventures and ideas, hence 
increasing value of existing products and services was defined by Drucker (1985) and, Low and 
MacMillan (1988). Timmons (1997) paid attention to leadership qualities and a specific set of 
mind which distinguish entrepreneurs. Therefore, as it can be seen, the organisational approach 
focuses, mainly, not on the behavioural microeconomic foundation but rather on evolution of 
                                                 
1
 There are spatial and temporal types of arbitrage defined in the literature. 
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organisational entities that stems from establishing a business. Hence, it defines a firm as not a 
realisation of an intention to profitably exploit own entrepreneurial ability, but rather as an 
organisational decision to extract rents from cooperation. In conclusion, although both 
approaches consider the same phenomenon, they not only define it differently but also emphasise 
different causes of emergence of entrepreneurship. Therefore, this thesis is more closely linked 
to the former economic approach as it focuses on economic conditions underlying a certain level 
of entrepreneurial activities rather than patterns of organisational behaviour. 
Before proceeding further to the analysis of the literature which is relevant to the purpose of the 
dissertation, it seems worth to note that further discussion of the literature review will be focused 
on the so-called equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activities thus will neglect issues related to 
emergence of new businesses, growth and closures.  
The model considered further will provide a fairly broad picture of entrepreneurship and 
underlying factors, therefore it seems expedient to consider the literature which pays attention to 
some of the factors which are worth to consider as determinants of the level of entrepreneurship. 
The first factor to be considered in the literature is macroeconomic conditions which certainly 
affect an environment which may be positive or negative for entrepreneurial activities. This 
group of factors includes interest rate (Storey & Greene, 2010), macroeconomic stability 
(Stiglitz, 2000), etc.  
Another important factor, which is widely discussed, is taxation. An effect of taxation on the 
level of entrepreneurial activities remains ambiguous in the literature. On the one hand, it is 
argued that low tax rates imply more incentive to run a business. For example, Folster (2002) 
showed that a tax decrease would be accompanied by an increase in entrepreneurial activities for 
the case of Sweden. Moreover, the author argues that a fairly low growth rate of Swedish 
economy can be explained by high taxes which discourage entrepreneurship. In addition, it is 
emphasised that profit is the main source of investment, thus, excess tax burden implies reducing 
availability of financial resources which has negative consequences especially in the long-run 
(Michaelas et al., 1999). On the other hand, there is an opinion that higher taxes might have 
positive effect on entrepreneurship. As it is claimed by Schuetze and Bruce (2004), it provides 
scopes for tax avoidance and tax evasion. In addition, the question of the effect of taxation 
becomes even more ambiguous when taking into account tax progressiveness. Peter (2009) 
concluded that entrepreneurship and a level of the shadow economy are not only influenced by 
an average level of tax rates but also on the level of progressiveness. The author explains this by 
saying that various levels of complications in tax systems increase costs of compliance. In my 
view, another possible explanation is that progressive tax system usually discriminate richer 
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share of population which usually have more power and opportunity to evade taxes without 
punishment due to bribes. Therefore, as noted by the author, there is a process of transition from 
complexity to simplicity of tax systems among countries. However, at the same time, Peter 
(2009) claims that flattening of taxes plays a big role only in the short run while in the long run 
the effect dies out. 
Another important factor is regulations which account for whether regulatory environment is 
favourable for business growth. This issue also remains controversial in the literature. On the one 
hand, it is claimed by Djankov (2002) that strict regulations discourage entrepreneurial entry. 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) concluded that higher regulations in EU usually are accompanied 
with worse business performance. On the other hand, Storey and Greene (2010) also emphasise 
that regulations are required for creating an environment for business growth and ensuring 
compliance with „rules of the game‟. 
The effect of education on entrepreneurship was also widely considered in the literature. A 
significant positive effect of education is emphasised in several works. Based on the summary by 
Storey and Greene (2010), a number of possible channels of such an effect might be considered: 
enhance knowledge and skills required to run a business; selection mechanism among able and 
less able individuals; more educated individuals usually have better access to the source of 
finance; etc. Nevertheless, as it is also said by Storey and Greene (2010), a number of empirical 
works such as Davidsson (2006) and Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg (2008) concluded 
that such effects are insignificant to be considered. 
A number of empirical works attempted to define another factors which accounted for a decision 
to become an entrepreneur, thus affecting the level of entrepreneurial activities in economy. 
Amit, Muller and Cockburn (1995) considered opportunity costs of being employed as a worker 
rather than entrepreneur as the main factor in the decision making process. In particular, an 
empirical analysis of the labour survey data suggests that those who become entrepreneurs 
experienced 10,5% lower average wage than those who stay within the „employee status‟. 
Possible critique which arises with regard to such results is that it does not necessarily show any 
causality channel. In addition, it is unlikely that only wage difference accounts for the choice of 
being entrepreneur while missing issues related to entrepreneurial environment and other non-
wage factors such as burdensome procedures which hinder an establishment of the business.  
An importance of understanding the roots of entrepreneurship was emphasised by Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1990). The paper focused on understanding an effect of capital constraints and 
inherent wealth as the main determinants for the youth population within the National Child 
Development Study dataset. To be more precise, the results suggest a significant effect of the 
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capital constraints which is in line with the theoretical discussion by Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989). In addition, the empirical results show that those who received 5000 pounds initial 
wealth endowment are 50% more likely to be involved in entrepreneurial activities. 
Such factors as entrepreneurial ability and risk aversion were considered by Van Praag and 
Cramer (2001) as those which play important role in distinguishing entrepreneurs from the 
employees on the labour market. Such results are explained within a general equilibrium model 
followed by the empirical consideration. In particular, empirical evidence for the case of 
Netherlands suggests that risk aversion is the main obstacle for being an entrepreneur since 
entrepreneurial activities usually involve higher extent to uncertainly compared to being a 
worker, which is in line with the ideas of Marshall and Schumpeter. In addition, it is also found 
that an appropriate level of entrepreneurial ability is required to profitably run a business. The 
main critique that is pertained to the consideration of entrepreneurial ability is that it is unclear 
what entrepreneurial ability actually is, since a number of authors considered general intelligence 
as an equivalent to such as ability, whereas others emphasised specific nature of the 
entrepreneurial skills, which cannot be learnt but rather are inherited.  Therefore, a consideration 
of the entrepreneurship purely within the scopes of entrepreneurial ability seems to pertain more 
to the philosophical discussion rather than rational economic decision making theory. 
One of the issues apart from motives for being an entrepreneur that attracted much attention is 
whether entrepreneurship is actually more profitable than regular employment. With this in 
mind, Hamilton (2000) investigated distribution of entrepreneurial earnings. The results clearly 
display the fact that nascent entrepreneurs have on average 25% lower wage compared to an 
entry position as a worker. In addition, this evidence seems even more striking while accounting 
for the fact that nascent entrepreneurs are prone to higher wage shocks as they do not usually 
have adequate risk insurance (health insurance, for instance). A number of limitations with 
regard to this paper relate to the fact that it does not shed light on why the entrepreneurs actually 
choose this career path if it involves a higher level of risks and lower expected wage on the 
earlier stages. Therefore, it is suggested that a number of factors such as entrepreneurial ability, 
risk aversion and various value of initial wealth endowment might be considered. 
As it seems clear from the research goal and methods advertised to be employed, it seems 
expedient to dedicate time to take a look at the literature which applies matching model theory to 
the field of labour market. Nowadays unemployment theory mainly exploits the grounds laid by 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) who proposed matching models as a 
powerful tool for analysis. The theory assumes that labour market behaviour and, hence 
entrepreneurship, is dependent on a number of individuals who decide to create vacancies 
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(become an entrepreneur) and, a number of individuals who are willing to fill the vacancy. 
However, a number of matches between created vacancies and perspective workers are 
dependent on the matching function
2
 which describes the rate of filling the vacancies. This rate is 
dependent on the ratio of vacancies to a number of people who look for a job. Imposing the 
equilibrium conditions allows obtaining an equilibrium level of unemployment, employment and 
a level of entrepreneurial activities. Nevertheless, as it can be noted, such a theory does not 
account for factors which were mentioned earlier in the literature review. Therefore, a number of 
works such as Lisi and Pugno (2010), and Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) augmented a baseline 
approach where entrepreneurs not only restricted in terms of ability to propose innovations and 
manage people, which is called „entrepreneurial ability‟, but also taking into account 
heterogeneity in the distribution of such abilities. As it was mentioned above, Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989) emphasised an importance of the liquidity constraints with the theoretical 
model and empirical analysis. In particular, the results suggest that imperfect credit markets bind 
financial opportunities of people to being only approximately one and a half times higher that 
their initial wealth. 
Fairlie and Krashinsky (2012) attempted to challenge the widely mentioned hypothesis of an 
crucial role of liquidity constraints. In particular, it was assumed a positive relationship between 
assets and self-employment as a support for the existence of the liquidity constraints. However, 
empirical results rejected this hypothesis. 
Influential paper by Ghatak and Jiang (2002) considered an effect of inequality on the 
occupational choice within the theoretical model. In particular, it is shown that absence of the 
credit market makes income inequality more severe in terms of occupational opportunities even 
if an individual has high ability for entrepreneurship. It is also shown that a higher extent to 
inequality in initial wealth has significant negative consequences for economic growth because 
due to very limited number of those who can actually be an entrepreneur and absence of 
selection by ability, the economy is trapped in a „bad equilibrium‟. 
Blancháower and Oswald (1998), and Kolakez and Legmann (2010) also included financial 
restrictions into consideration which possibly affect a decision to enter labour market as an 
entrepreneur or employee and, stem from imperfect access to a financial market within the 
matching model approach. In particular, Kolakez and Legmann (2010), using all these 
augmentations to the baseline matching model, discuss the cases of socially non-optimal 
outcomes when credit constraints make it more profitable for low-ability but high-capital 
endowed individuals to become entrepreneur, whereas it is rational for high-ability but low 
                                                 
2
 Cobb-Douglas function form is widely accepted to be used as it more closely matches the empirical evidence 
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capital-endowed individuals to enter a labour market as employees whereas social optimality 
implies to be vice versa. Such a model will provide the basis for the theoretical consideration 
further in this paper, therefore will be discussed in mode details in the section 3. 
To sum up, this chapter discussed the existent literature which considers a definition of the 
entrepreneurship and factors underlying a certain level of entrepreneurial activities within the 
economy. As a result, a number of factors such as financial constraints, ability, wealth 
distribution, taxation, labour market condition, etc. are considered. However, hardly any work 
considered a systematic effect both empirically and theoretically. In addition, a number of works 
found controversial evidence of the effect of certain factors on the level of entrepreneurial 
activities. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, it is government effectiveness which, 
presumably, determines appropriateness of the environment for development of entrepreneurial 
activities. Therefore, the following chapters will proceed with systematic theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the issue of interest. 
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3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. Description of the Benchmark Model 
 
As it was mentioned in the literature review, such phenomenon as entrepreneurship has been a 
subject to research within the framework of various models. Some of the models included a 
number of the factors that bring about a certain level of entrepreneurship or entrepreneurial 
activities
3
 within the country. Furthermore, a wide range of theoretical approaches were 
employed to address the issue. However, as it was mentioned earlier, this thesis suggests that a 
matching model approach seems to be the most appropriate way to proceed along in this research 
because it allows considering the labour, unemployment and entrepreneurs (vacancies created by 
entrepreneurs) as a complex and interdependent system which, in turn, is dependent on economic 
conditions which determine profitability and expediency of being self-employed. Before 
proceeding to a further discussion, it is important to note that the benchmark model used in the 
analysis is focused not on the aggregate entrepreneurial activities within the economy but rather 
the mechanism underlying the decision to become entrepreneur. However, in order to explain the 
level of entrepreneurial activities, it seems important to understand the underlying decision 
making process for which purpose the theoretical framework suggested by Kolakez and Lehman 
(2010) seems to be ideal. As it was mentioned earlier, this thesis argues that, in the case of 
„perfect‟ economic conditions, only those who have a required level of entrepreneurial abilities 
will enter the self-employment sector. However, existence of imperfect institutions, inefficient 
government, financial constraints and a significant level of income inequality are the main 
reasons for the „distorted‟ incentives to become an entrepreneur. Therefore, this section will 
augment the theoretical foundation in order to theoretically support the logic presented here and 
provide systematic explanation of the mechanism underlying the incentives to become an 
entrepreneur under various levels of government effectiveness, financial constraints and wealth 
inequality, thus affecting aggregate entrepreneurial activities which are assumed to be displayed 
by a number of created vacancies. In particular, this subsection will present the benchmark 
theoretical model which seems to be the most promising to proceed further with the theoretical 
analysis. As it was mentioned before, such a model exploits the foundation of the matching 
                                                 
3
 As it was mentioned before, this thesis treats the definition of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial activities as 
closely related. In addition, being entrepreneur and creating a vacancy is assumed to be synonyms here also, which 
is in line with arguments of Lisi and Pugno (2010). 
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model proposed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), and Pissarides (2000). Therefore, it seems 
expedient to start off with a brief discussion of the matching theory. 
The matching theory assumes that   is a share of individuals whose rational decision is to enter a 
labour market as a worker whereas     is a share of individuals who decide to be 
entrepreneurs and create V vacancies. Therefore, matching functions denote a number of 
matches between vacancies and workers in the form constant return to scale function        
which is continuously differentiable, increasing and concave in S and V (usually Cobb-Douglas 
form function is used). Therefore, labour market is characterised by „tightness‟   
 
 
 which is 
the ratio of a number of vacancies to a number of individuals who look for a job, thus are willing 
to fill vacancies created by entrepreneurs. Therefore, a probability that a vacancy is filled by the 
workers can be described as 
     
 
     . On the other hand, a probability that worker fills a 
vacancy is 
     
 
             , where the function       is positive, decreasing and 
convex. Such functions should satisfy Inada conditions
4
 as it is widely accepted in the literature 
(Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2001; Lisi & Pugno, 2010; Stevens, 2007; Boeri & Garibaldi, 2006). 
Hence, it is possible to obtain value functions for both entrepreneurs and workers, which are 
expected profitability values for the corresponding type of employment.  
It seems worth now to turn attention to the specific framework suggested by Kolakez, Legmann 
(2010). According to the model, a choice of the sector of employment (worker or entrepreneur) 
is based on the expected profitability of the corresponding sector which, as it was mentioned 
above, is described by the value functions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
                            ;                            . 
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where     –  value of the filled vacancy (expected profitability); 
   
  – value of a vacancy for a worker; 
y – revenue generated by a filled vacancy; 
 w – wage paid to a worker; 
 k – capital required to create a vacancy; 
 r – lending interest rate5; 
z – initial wealth. 
  
 Therefore, the formulas presented above suggest that a decision with regard to an 
occupational choice is dependent on tightness of the labour market, capital requirements, wage 
rate and capital costs (lending interest rate). An important parameter to be discussed separately is 
a wage rate which plays an important role in attractiveness of being a worker. In particular, in 
line with a common matching theory, wage setting is assumed to follow the Nash bargaining 
rule, which implies that wage is dependent on a bargaining power of workers in the form of 
       . Based on the Nash bargaining rule, the following equation is maximised with respect 
to w: 
   
 
            
The maximization problem thus yields to      . Based on this transformation, the 
expressions for the value functions can be expressed as follows: 
                      
  
                     
Apart from the factors discussed so far, each individual is characterised by the corresponding 
entrepreneurial ability   and, as it was mentioned above, initial wealth  . Therefore, there are 
two main constraints that are faced by entrepreneurs. Firstly, this is entrepreneurial ability which 
is a maximum number of vacancies which can be created. Secondly, this is initial wealth which 
is related to credit constraints, since the real world credit market is imperfect. In particular, it is 
                                                 
5
 Here lending interest rate is used because it generally represents actual costs of capital for those who borrow for 
the purpose of consumption or private investment, such as creating a business. 
 15 
 
assumed that entrepreneurs can borrow up to λ        where λ=1 corresponds to the case of 
absence of credit market or, in other words, the case when individuals can rely only on their own 
initial wealth. The case when λ=  corresponds a perfect credit market conditions, thus no 
financial constraints are faced by the individuals. 
Therefore, an entrepreneur with corresponding parameters   and   solves the following problem: 
        
 
             
s.t:    ;  
        
Since it is suggested that    is always positive6, potential entrepreneurs will open as many 
vacancies as possible depending on their entrepreneurial ability and initial wealth constraints. To 
be more precise, as it was partially discussed above, initial wealth affects borrowing capacity of 
the particular person since one of the issues which is of interest here is capital constraints. 
Therefore, the following equation defines borrowing ability of the person in the economy: 
  
 
 
 
Hence, it is straightforward to show based on the discussion so far that an optimal number of 
created vacancies takes the following form: 
                 
Substituting the equation for a number of vacancies yields to the following equation of the 
optimisation problem: 
                  
          
In order to proceed with further analysis, it is required to denote the ratio of expected gain of 
being a worker to the expected profitability of being an entrepreneur with one created vacancy: 
  
  
         
  
 
As it is proved by Kolakez and Legmann (2010), the following requirements should be satisfied 
for the individual who choose to be an entrepreneur:             .7 As it can be noted from 
the discussion so far, this ratio is dependent on tightness of the market, bargaining power of the 
workers, lending interest rate and capital requirements. Therefore, partial equilibrium can be 
                                                 
6
 See Kolakez and Legmann (2010) for the proof and explanation. 
7
 For the proof see Kolakez and Legmann (2010) p. 5-6. 
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obtained by extending the formula with the parameters of interest, which yields to the following 
equation: 
  
          
                    
 
The formulas obtained by Kolakez and Legmann (2010) and presented above suggest a number 
of observations. Firstly, tightness of the market negatively affects an incentive to become an 
entrepreneur (  increases). In addition, such parameters as bargaining power of workers, capital 
requirements and lending interest rate also negatively affect expected profitability of 
entrepreneurs compared to being a worker. In line with the discussion so far, it is possible to 
derive an equation for a number of workers in the economy: 
                   
 
   
 
 
   
            
 
 
   
 
   
 
Applying the same logic, a number of vacancies created in the economy is determined by the 
following equation: 
                      
  
 
 
  
 
 
            
 
  
 
 
   
 
   
 
Therefore, based on the propositions and discussion so far, such formulas suggest that a number 
of workers in the economy is positively dependent on the ratio of profitability of being a worker 
to the expected vacancy profitability but depends negatively on μ. In contrast, a number of 
vacancies created in the economy is negatively dependent on ϕ but positively on μ. It is 
explained by the fact that as worker-related profitability increases, more individuals choose to 
enter the labour market as workers, which, in turn, increases an aggregate level of 
entrepreneurial activities. 
As it is clear from the discussion so far, Kolakez and Legmann (2010) provided a sound 
theoretical framework for understanding causes underlying a decision to become an 
entrepreneur, which, in turn, directly affect a level of entrepreneurial activities. In particular, the 
model allows investigating effects of financial constraints, labour market conditions and 
individual ability distribution on the entrepreneurial conditions within the economy. However, 
the model left institutional factor and government behaviour unaccounted which, presumably, 
have a significant effect on the aggregate level of entrepreneurial activities within the economy 
and, thus should be considered. Therefore, the next subsection will an extention in order to 
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provide a theoretical model which attempts to reflect the real processes underlying a certain level 
of entrepreneurial activities within an economy. 
 
3.2. Extension of the Theoretical Model 
 
As it was clear from the theoretical discussion so far, the model presented by Kolakez and 
Legmann (2010), which is, in turn, based on the matching theory of Pissarides, provides a 
promising theoretical foundation for understanding the nature of entrepreneurship and explains 
the differences in the level of entrepreneurial activities among countries with the help of 
imperfect credit market, which implies importance of initial wealth endowment. Therefore, it is 
suggested that wealth distribution in the society plays an important role to define how many 
vacancies can be opened taking into account available wealth and a fixed share that they can 
borrow. An interpretation of the results suggested by Kolakez and Legmann (2010) slightly 
differs from what is interpreted by this thesis. In particular, the focus of the benchmark model 
was mainly on the labour market outcomes in terms of employment, unemployment and created 
jobs in the economy. Taking into account an assumption that all the economies have roughly 
equal distribution of entrepreneurial ability in the society but vary in terms of wealth distribution, 
the results can be considered as a basis for considering entrepreneurial activities. In other words, 
it can be said that differences in a number of vacancies among economies is accounted by 
differences in a number of entrepreneurs. It means that a number of vacancies are treated as a 
proxy for a level of entrepreneurial activities since it is not an increase in ability of current 
entrepreneurs, which enable them to post more jobs, but rather changes in economic 
environment, which makes it more profitable to other individuals to become entrepreneurs and, 
thus, open vacancies. 
However, as it was mentioned before, empirical evidence and various economic theories 
discussed in the literature review do not fully support the results of the model as it does not 
capture a significant part of the variation. Moreover, a number of studies suggested ambiguous 
results with regard to some of the variables such as wealth distribution and taxation. Therefore, 
this subsection is aimed at augmenting the benchmark model with a number of extensions that, 
presumably, will help to understand behavioural patterns underlying a certain level of 
entrepreneurial activities within an economy. 
In particular, this thesis argues that it is governmental quality and institutions which account for 
environment and labour market, thus affect expected profitability and incentives to become an 
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entrepreneur. It is assumed in the model that a government plays a role of an agent which 
collects taxes from both entrepreneurs and workers, and, redistributes them via two channels: 
alleviating constraints and burdensome procedures by reducing capital required to establish a 
vacancy and, increasing profitability of a vacancy by way of investment in education, which, in 
turn, increases expected productivity of the worker who fills a created vacancy. However, as it 
was mentioned above, such expenditures are financed purely by means of taxes. Therefore, a 
possible ambiguous effect of taxation arises here. To be more precise, effectiveness of such 
investment in the form of return of paid taxes to the workers and entrepreneurs is dependent on 
the quality of institutions that are responsible for delivering high public policy effectiveness 
through collected taxes. 
It seems worth now to start with expressions which are aimed to capture effects, which, as it is 
hypothesised, play an important role. Firstly, there are taxes on labour personal income    and 
on entrepreneurial profit   . In addition, there are two main directions of government 
expenditures considered here as those which affect entrepreneurial environment. In particular, as 
it was mentioned above, a government invests a certain share of collected taxes for the purpose 
of increasing profitability of entrepreneurs.  
As can be seen from the benchmark model, there is an exogenous level of labour productivity y 
which is assumed to be the only production factor in the model since capital is required only to 
open a vacancy. Let us assume that labour productivity can be enhanced by way of educational 
attainment. However, education is costly; hence, productivity y is dependent on capital    which 
is invested in education. This function can be expressed as follows: 
  
 
   
 
An implication of this formula is that higher costs of education within a country imply that fewer 
people can afford it. An exponential form of this function was chosen as an alternative to, for 
example, a linear function as it does not presuppose a negative values of y in the case of a very 
high   . The variable q is mainly used for the purposes of constant and can be interpreted as 
quality or effectiveness of education. 
The role of the government is that it affects initial costs of education by way of subsidising it 
through government expenditure which comes from collected taxes. Therefore, an educational 
system is characterised by some initial costs of education    which corresponds to the case of the 
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government is zero spending on the educational sphere. However, it is assumed, that it should 
spend some exogenous share   8 of the total tax income τ to reduce such costs: 
   
  
        
 
A parameter m is one of the key exogenous parameters in the model which denotes the quality of 
institutions or government effectiveness. This parameter is treated as exogenous; therefore, any 
behaviour of agents cannot affect it as it is inherited historically. 
A combination of the formulas yields: 
  
  
 
  
             
 
The formula suggests that productivity is dependent positively on initial quality of education   , 
a share of the collected taxes spent on alleviating education costs   , a sum of collected taxes and 
quality of institutions m. In addition, the level of productivity is negatively related to capital 
costs of education in the absence of government intervention.  
In addition, it was widely discussed before that each vacancy requires k amount of capital. It 
includes not only formal capital but also burdensome procedures that are required to overcome in 
order to open a business. It can be expressed with the following formula:  
  
  
              
 
Effectiveness of the government intervention is also dependent on the quality of institutions 
which denotes effectiveness of such investment.  
The graphical and analytical analysis of the variables will be presented in the next subsection but 
it seems worth to note now that, as it can be seen from the figure 3.1, capital required to open a 
vacancy is decreasing in the sum of taxes collected, whereas productivity, by means of an 
increase in the affordability of education, increases. 
 
                                                 
8
 Within the dissertation shares of taxes spent on particular purpose are constant and exogenous.  
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Figure 3.1. Relationships between productivity (y), capital required to establish a vacancy (k) 
and a sum of collected taxes (τ) 
 
In line with the discussion so far, the benchmark value functions can be modified such that they 
yield to the following expression for the profitability of a worker related to profitability of 
entrepreneur: 
  
             
 
  
                     
        
              
          
 
  
              
 
The formula suggests that expected profitability of being an entrepreneur is also dependent now 
on the quality of institutions, both kinds of taxes included in the model and a share of taxes spent 
on each of the policy directions. In particular, it seems worth to note that it is not only total tax 
rate but also a particular difference (ratio) between personal labour income tax and corporate 
profit tax that play an important role in the model. 
It seems also important to remind that the final formulas from the previous subsection which 
determines particular number of entrepreneurs and workers in the economy: 
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Analysis of Kolakez and Legmann (2010) to some extent lacked an insight into the model 
solution. In particular, it did not provide clear analysis of the effect of income distribution in the 
society and distribution of entrepreneurial abilities which are incorporated in the function 
      . To be more precise, it is believed in this thesis that entrepreneurial ability is distributed 
in the society homogeneously among the countries. In other words, it is, approximately, an equal 
share of highly-skilled entrepreneurs in the society. Hence, it is not the factor which accounts for 
the differences among countries. However, it is wealth distribution which varies significantly 
among countries and, presumably, play an important role for the aggregate level of 
entrepreneurship. 
To sum up, this subsection was dedicated to augmentation of the benchmark model by Kolakez 
and Legmann (2010) in order to understand the effect of taxation, quality of institutions and 
government expenditures on the aggregate level of entrepreneurship in the country, which, 
presumably, are important factors which were missing before. Therefore, the next subsection will 
be devoted to analysis of the theoretical results, which are expected to result in broader 
understanding of the issue under consideration.  
 
3.3. Theoretical Results and Analysis 
 
Augmentations to the benchmark model of Kolakez and Legmann (2010) that were presented in 
the previous subsection concerned mainly incorporation of an institutional factor into the model 
in order to explain ambiguous results that can be witnessed with regard to an effect of the quality 
of institutions on effects of taxation, interest rate, capital constraints and wealth distribution on 
the level of entrepreneurial activities within the country. 
It seems worth to remind that the main theoretical results obtained so far were related mainly to 
the effect on the ratio of expected profitability to be a worker to the expected profitability to be 
an entrepreneur who creates one vacancy. Therefore, theoretical analysis will be dedicated 
mostly to the analysis of the function   described in the previous sections. However, it seems 
important to remind, in order to avoid confusion, that despite the fact that parameter   is linked 
to the question of decision to become entrepreneur based on the expected profitability compared 
to profitability of being a worker, it is expected to be an indirect measure of a share of 
entrepreneurs in the society in the form of created vacancies. It is exactly what is shown by the 
formulas 1 and 2 in the previous subsections. It means that in case of an increase in  , some 
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individuals, who were previously employed as a worker, now find it more profitable to post a 
number of vacancies (again dependent on personal wealth and entrepreneurial ability). 
Before proceeding further, the results presented in this section are obtained using simulation of 
the model presented in the previous section, thus numerical model solution was achieved using 
selected parameters and constant values. The numerical results will not be presented here as they 
do not provide convenient and meaningful insight but can be provided on request. The model 
parameters in the simulation were based on the works of Lisi and Pugno (2010), Boeri and 
Garibaldi (2006) and adjusted such that parameters satisfy the condition of yielding to positive 
value functions and main outcomes of interest. The parameters that were chosen for the 
simulation are presented in a table in the appendix. The final note which is related to the 
graphical analysis below is that it is an inverted function  , which is of interest because we are 
not interested in the relative attractiveness of being the worker but rather in the relative 
attractiveness of being an entrepreneur. As it was discussed above, such relationship is treated 
here as a direct proxy of entrepreneurial activities in the economy. Therefore, it seems worth to 
look at the effect that an institutional factor has on entrepreneurial incentives, and thus, 
according to the model and assumption within the thesis, on entrepreneurial activities, which is 
presented on the figure 3.2: 
 
Figure 3.2. Effect of the institutional or governmental quality (  ) on the level of entrepreneurial 
activities ( ) 
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As it is clear from the graph above, the model suggests that there exists a negative relationship 
between quality of institutions and a level of entrepreneurial activities. Such theoretical results 
are in line with the main hypothesis of this thesis, which says that incentives to become an 
entrepreneur stem from inadequate institutions which, in turn, cannot ensure an existence of 
labour market that can adequately match skills and provide adequate income for workers. 
Therefore, poor institutions can be considered as a prerequisite for the „forced entrepreneurship‟ 
when individuals are simply forced to become entrepreneurs because of inability to find an 
adequate match of their skills on the labour market. The noteworthy point is that the function 
    is convex and decreasing in the quality of institution. 
Another important factor which is of interest here is taxation. As it was mentioned in the 
previous section, taxes are spitted in the model as labour income tax and corporate tax which act 
as additional costs for workers and entrepreneurs, correspondingly. Therefore, it is not only a 
total sum of taxes but also the ratio
9
 of corporate to labour tax is important to consider. As it was 
mentioned earlier, analysis of all other variables considered in this subsection will provided for 
two opposite cases: the case of bad institution with the effectiveness close to zero (0.01 is used 
for the simulation) and for the case of perfect institutions with 100% effectiveness (the value 1 is 
used). Therefore, it seems worth to start with the effect of the total taxes collected with the 
corresponding case of institutional quality presented on the figure 3.3: 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The ratio rather than the difference is considered here for the reasons of model solution. Using the ratio but not the 
difference seems not crucial for the obtained results 
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Figure 3.3. Effect of the sum of collected taxes (  ) on the level of entrepreneurial activities   ) 
in the case of perfect and imperfect institutions  
 
The results presented below confirm an ambiguous effect that taxation might have on the 
entrepreneurial activities depending on the quality of institutions. The results presented above 
correspond to the case when labour and corporate taxes are not differentiated. To be more 
precise, the graph shows a negative effect of higher taxation on the incentives to become 
entrepreneur, whereas the effect is fairly flat but positive for the case of poor institutions. In 
addition, the curve which corresponds to the case of high quality institutions is placed higher 
compared to the low quality institutions curve. A possible explanation for such results is that 
higher taxation, in the case of effective institutions, implies that taxes are effectively invested for 
the various purposes such as education, alleviating tax burden, etc., which are not considered in 
the model. In contrast, in the case of poor institutions, an additional unit of collected taxes does 
not provide any additional value for entrepreneurs or workers but because of the functional 
forms used in the model, a positive effect is even less for the workers since usually their 
bargaining power is less than 50%, thus higher taxes imply more incentives to become 
entrepreneur. 
Nonetheless, more important factor in the case under consideration is the difference between the 
sources of taxation. In particular, as it was mentioned before, the ratio of corporate tax to the 
labour tax is considered. The relationship between the ratio (n) and the level of entrepreneurial 
activities are presented on the figure 3.4: 
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Figure 3.4. Effect of the ratio of corporate tax to labour tax ratio ( ) on the entrepreneurial 
activities ( ) in the case of perfect and imperfect institutions 
 
The figure 3.4 above shows that higher ratio implies a lower level of incentives to become an 
entrepreneur compared to being a worker for both cases independently on the quality of 
institutions. However, the case of more effective institutions is characterised by more flat 
negative relationship where an increase in the ratio implies a relatively small decrease in the 
level entrepreneurial activities compared to the case of low quality institutions when a slight 
increase in the corporate tax compared to the labour tax implies a considerable drop in the 
expected relative profitability of opening the vacancy. The intuition behind the results is that, as 
it was mentioned above, better institutions implies better environment for workers, thus they are 
better off being a worker without involving themselves in „risky employment‟. Therefore, the 
curve which corresponds to case of high quality institutions is placed far below the line 
corresponding to the high quality institutions line. Relatively higher extent to steepness of the 
poor institutions curve can be explained by the fact that high quality institutions imply existing 
of proper labour market which decreases an incentive to become an owner of the business hence, 
a relative corporate tax increase has smaller effect compared to the case of poor institution where 
elasticity of the entrepreneurship to the ratio is much higher. The final figure demonstrates an 
effect of lending interest rate on the level of entrepreneurial activities. The results are presented 
below on the figure 3.5: 
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Figure 3.5. Effect of lending interest rate ( ) on a level of entrepreneurial activities ( ) in the 
case of perfect and imperfect institutions 
 
Compared to the case of the ratio of corporate tax rate to the labour tax, the results presented on 
the figure 3.5 suggest a similar effect. In particular, the curve for the poor institutions is shifted 
upwards and is much steeper while both curves remain decreasing. The logic applied to 
explaining such results is also similar to those stated above. To be more precise, better 
institutions, because of more suitable environment to seek employment as a worker, reduce a 
marginal effect of changes in interest rate which explains the differences in the steepness of the 
curves. In contrast, initially better quality of institutions places the low quality institutions curve 
higher compared to the „comparison‟ curve. 
Therefore, theoretical results achieved so far allow explaining the role of the institutions on the 
level of entrepreneurial activities through varying the effect of taxation and interest rate, and 
assuming a close connection between a number of vacancies created in the economy with a 
number of entrepreneurs, which, in turn, seems reasonable based on the model assumption 
related to the distribution of entrepreneurial abilities and wealth. Therefore, the final factor of 
interest is wealth distribution. It seems worth to remind that the theoretical results provided by 
the Kolakez and Legmann (2010) are summarised in the formulas 1 and 2 mentioned in the 
subsection 3.1, which defined a number of vacanies and workers in the economy. The analysis 
provided by Kolakez and Legmann (2010) clearly lacked the implications that arise as a result of 
the theoretical augmentation achieved so far. In particular, the results presented in the subsection 
which implies an increase or a decrease in the value of the function  , implies also a decrease or 
an increase in the number of entrepreneurs, correspondingly, which stems from the consideration 
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above and formulas presented by Kolakez and Legmann (2010). To be more precise, the factors 
considered above together with the effect of institutional factor, affect expected relative 
profitability of being a worker. This, in turn, based on the formulas 1 and 2, implies a 
corresponding change in a level of entrepreneurial activities (a number of entrepreneurs in the 
economy), which, however, is dependent on the functional form of the distribution of 
entrepreneurial abilities and wealth
10
. 
To sum up, this section discussed the theoretical foundation by Kolakez and Legmann (2010), 
described augmentations and conducted analysis of the achieved results. It allowed concluding a 
number of theoretical implications that will be tested in the next section. In particular, it is 
explained how taxation, income inequality and costs of capital (lending interest rate) might have 
ambiguous effect on a level of entrepreneurial activities in the economy. Moreover, it is 
suggested that this is quality of government which account for the effect that these variables have 
on the aggregate level of entrepreneurship. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, it seems 
important to note that a number of points related to connection between further empirical 
analysis and theoretical results achieved so far. Firstly, the analysis here was focused on a 
number of vacancies created in the economy while the variable of interest in the next section will 
be a particular percentage of entrepreneurial activities in the economy in terms of business 
management or ownership. Despite the fact that these outcomes are unlikely to be the same, it is 
believed that they move together, as a result of an effect of the factors discussed above. This 
assumption seems reasonable considering the following logic based on the theoretical 
assumptions by Kolakez and Legmann (2010): each person can open a fixed number of 
vacancies depending on individual ability and personal wealth only if it is expected to be more 
profitable than being a worker. Therefore, changes in economic environment considered in the 
thesis imply that more vacancies are created if more individuals find it more profitable. Hence, it 
would be supported by the corresponding sign of the coefficient in the empirical model in the 
next section.  
Another important point to be discussed is the fact that theoretical model does not consider 
quality of government as a factor which directly affects a level of entrepreneurial activities but 
rather as a factor which affects the outcome with regard to changes in other explanatory 
variables. Therefore, an empirical model discussed in the next section will incorporate this effect 
by means of using an interaction term, which, literally, will denote changes in the effect that a 
certain factor will have depending on the government effectiveness. 
                                                 
10
 It is meant here that change in   implies change in the limit of the integral in the formulas 1 and 2. Therefore, 
calculating this integral yields to a number of entrepreneurs depending on the chosen functional forms. 
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1. Description of Data and Its Relationship with Theoretical Results. 
 
The literature review presented in the previous section displays a lack of systematic analysis of 
the factors that influence a level of entrepreneurship on the aggregate level. In addition, it results 
in the failure to achieve the consensus between empirical and theoretical understanding of such a 
phenomenon. An explanation that was suggested in this thesis is that most of the works known 
on the time of writing this paper lacked an attention to the quality of institution or government 
effectiveness, which, presumably, has a significant effect on the economic environment affecting 
incentives to become an entrepreneur. In other words, the theoretical model considers a level of 
entrepreneurial activities through an aggregate decision, which also plays a role of a link 
between the results of theoretical and empirical analysis conducted in this section. Therefore, this 
chapter will shed light on empirical evidence in order to see what factors play a significant role 
in determination of the size of the entrepreneurship within the country. In turn, this subsection 
will present variables and corresponding data which are used in the empirical analysis further in 
this section. 
Before proceeding to the description of the variables and corresponding sources, it seems worth 
to mention that this is a panel framework, which uses observations for different countries within 
the certain timeframe.  
The first variable of interest here is a level of entrepreneurial activities within the country for a 
certain period of time. In particular, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor dataset is used. The 
variable which represents entrepreneurial activities is “Established Businesses: number of adults 
[18-64 years old] per 100 involved in established firm as owner and manager for which salaries 
or wages have been paid for more than 42 months”. Because the dataset is available mostly for 
the years from 2002 to 2012, it results in a use of the dataset 2002-2012 for all the variables. In 
addition, it is fairly limited to a number of countries where the survey took place. Nevertheless, 
the dataset contains various countries from various continents and with various level of 
government effectiveness which corresponds to the purpose of the research.
11
 Therefore, it is 
suggested that the chosen parameter is an appropriate indicator because it captures „equilibrium‟ 
entrepreneurship while sorting out businesses that were closed down in a short period of time 
after establishing. 
                                                 
11
 For more details see the Appendix which contains the dataset used in the analysis. 
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It seems worth to turn attention to explanatory variables used in the analysis. According to the 
theoretical model presented in the previous chapter it is required to obtain baseline variables that 
can be further transformed to obtain the variables which represent government effectiveness, 
lending interest rate, tax ratio and income distribution.  
As an indicator which, presumably, can adequately describe government effectiveness, an 
average of Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality with equal weights is chosen. Both 
indicators are estimated by the World Bank. A motivation for using a combination of indicators 
consists in importance to capture a wider sense of government effectiveness since these indexes 
account for different „areas‟ of government quality. In particular, according to the definition 
provided by the World Bank, Government Effectiveness indicator includes survey responses 
with regard to such issues as quality of public goods and services, a level of bureaucracy, public 
labour competency, a level of political pressure of services provided, government credibility and 
control over bank operations. The Regulatory Quality indicator includes such factors as market-
friendliness of the policies and a level of excessive burden with respect to business development. 
As it can be seen, the former indicator considers the quality of government as a provider of the 
public services and a policy institution while the latter concerns more with ability of a 
government to create adequate conditions for business growth. It is also noteworthy that such 
parameters usually go „hand-in-hand‟ among countries. Therefore, an average of these 
parameters is expected to account for the variance of a broader sense of governmental quality, 
which, presumably, plays a crucial role according to the discussion in the previous chapter. 
Another important factor to consider in the model is taxation. Again, in order to capture the 
broader sense of the taxation as it is suggested by the theoretical discussion, corporate tax rate, 
which affects profitability of the business, and personal income tax, which affects the final 
income of the worker, are included into consideration. Both of the variables are obtained using 
the World Bank dataset. However, as it was widely discussed in the previous chapter, it is not the 
sum of collected taxes but rather a difference between the corporate tax rate and labour income 
tax which have a significant effect on expected profitability of opening a business compared to 
being a worker. Therefore, it is suggested using a ratio of these taxes to capture such an effect. 
The reason for choosing the ratio rather than a difference roots in the fact that the higher both 
taxes are, consequently, the less important effect the deference between them has. 
The next variable under consideration is a lending interest rate which implies how costly the 
capital is to borrow to open the business. In conjunction with the income distribution variable 
discussed below, this parameter is assumed to capture the liquidity constraints that are faced by 
the entrepreneurs. In addition, the analysis, then, implies that basic capital costs, apart from 
 30 
 
burdensome procedures, are homogeneous among the countries. The data on lending interest rate 
is taken from the World Bank database. 
The final variable of interest is income distribution. As it was clear from the previous chapter, it 
affects the initial wealth that plays an important role in defining liquidity constraints. In 
particular, it is believed but not tested here is that income equality is correlated with the average 
wealth in a society as these are more advanced economies that can „afford‟ relatively equal 
income distribution. Therefore, as it was mentioned above, income distribution and lending 
interest rate variables are assumed to adequately capture liquidity constraints. Similarly to most 
of the variables discussed so far, the data for income inequality is obtained using the World Bank 
database on the GINI coefficient. This coefficient captures statistical distribution of income 
within the country. To be more precise, the higher is coefficient, the more unequal the income is 
distributed within the country.
12
 For example, the value of 0 suggests perfectly equal 
distribution, whereas value of 100 suggests perfectly unequal wealth distribution. 
The table 4.1 below presents a statistical summary of the data used in the analysis: 
Table 4.1. Statistical Summary of the Data 
Variable N of 
observations 
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Government 
Effectiveness 
546 .7082314 .9449319 -1.371542 2.407654 
Regulatory 
Quality 
546 .63714 .8949051 -1.725779 1.939 
Government 
Quality 
546 .6726857 .9036332 -1.37062 2.158572 
Level of 
Entrepreneurial 
Activities 
416 6.984255 3.977052 1.08 30.1 
Corporate Tax 
Rate 
605 27.04466 7.263765 6.424695 55 
Personal 
Income Tax 
Rate 
597 34.9732 
 
13.27812 0 62.3 
Tax Ratio 581 .8984831 .669426 .1590271 6 
Income 
Distribution 
384 37.97906 9.539824 24.2 67.4 
 
                                                 
12
 For more details on GINI coefficient see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI 
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As it can be seen from the data, each of the variables included in the analysis captures a wide 
range of values for the cases of high and low government quality, tax ratio, level of 
entrepreneurship and income distribution, thus the obtained dataset seems to be valid for the 
purpose of analysis. In addition, as it will be also discussed in more details in the next section, an 
empirical analysis will contain also interaction variables which are the product of two variables. 
However, such variables are not included in the summary here since they are fully derived from 
the „basic‟ variables. It is important to note that as it was mentioned before, some observations 
are missing for a number of countries. The effect of missing observations on the validity of 
analysis will be discussed in the next subsection. 
The final point which is important to mention is a connection between the variables described in 
this subsection and theoretical model obtained in the section 3, which constitutes a „bridge‟ 
between theoretical results and an empirical part of the paper. The main outcome of interest in 
the theoretical model was a number of vacancies created in the economy by entrepreneurs. 
Hence, it is assumed that such parameters as a number of vacancies and a number of 
entrepreneurs closely related since an increase in a number of entrepreneurs inevitably leads to 
an increase in a number of vacancies created in the economy. Therefore, it is suggested that a 
number of vacancies considered in the theoretical model is directly and closely linked to a 
measure of a number of entrepreneurs. In other words, if some factor causes an increase in a 
number of individuals who choose to open a business, it leads to an increase in a number of 
created vacancies. Therefore, an empirical discussion in this section is based on the theoretical 
model and will allow evaluating whether it reflects real behavioural patterns. Consequently, 
other variables described in this subsection, represent parameters, namely wealth distribution, 
interest rate on borrowing capital, government effectiveness, tax ratio, correspondingly. 
The last point relates to a connection of theoretical results and specific features of a use of 
government effectiveness term. To be more precise, quality of government is not a factor which 
influences the outcome of interest directly, but, according to the model, it influences an extent to 
which other independent variables would affect the level of entrepreneurial activities. In other 
words, a change in the variable, which denotes quality of government, results in a change in 
steepness of the curve, which means existence of an interaction effect. Therefore, the model 
discussed in this section will include an institutional factor as an interaction term only. These 
issues together with general methodology used in the analysis will be discussed in the next 
subsection in more details. 
 
 32 
 
4.2. Discussion of the Methods 
 
As it was widely discussed in the previous chapter, fairly rich data obtained from the World 
Bank and the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor databases allowed achieving the purpose of the 
empirical part of the research. The nature of data is such that it combines annual observations for 
a number of countries with various levels of development for a time frame from 2002 to 2012. 
As it was mentioned before, there is a number of missing observations. However, it is believed 
that this is not due to any kind of selection that might bias the estimation but it is rather random. 
In addition, according to the Stata, the panel is strongly balanced, which is concluded upon 
exporting the data and can be proven by running the Do-file presented in the appendix. 
Therefore, any particular methods that are aimed to deal with such an issue are not required. 
Before proceeding further, it seems important to note that this subsection will discuss a number 
of theoretical issues with regards to econometric model to be used, thus, will widely refer to such 
sources as Green (2003), Cameron and Trivedi (2005), and Verbeek (2008). Therefore, all the 
discussion within this subsection will be theoretically based on the mentioned sources. 
In line with the discussion so far, a panel data framework will be used in the model. The next 
subsection will consider a particular form of the estimated model more closely, while this 
subsection pays more attention to main theoretical standpoints underlying model estimation. 
Therefore, the model to be estimated takes the following general form: 
                  
where,     – dependent variable; 
      – vector of independent variables; 
    – unobserved heterogeneity term; 
     – error term. 
 
It seems necessary to discuss a number of issues related to a use of panel models. A number of 
issues with regard to exploiting a panel data framework arise when dealing with incomplete 
(missing observations), unbalanced and rotating panels. Nonetheless, the first two issues usually 
do not imply significant problems if we can ensure that unbalancing and missing observations 
are not a result of any kind of selection bias, attritions or optimising behaviour, whereas rotating 
panels do not generally imply any problems. Therefore, these issues will not be raised further in 
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the discussion as it is believed that this is not the case with data used in the analysis due to a 
nature of the data. 
Another kind of issues is related to so-called exogeniety problems. In particular, there are several 
kinds of exogeniety that are considered. It is a strict exogeniety which assumes that a vector X is 
fully uncorrelated with any current, past, future values of error term and a vector of unobserved 
heterogeneity. Weak exogeniety implies the assumption described above but with regard to only 
current and past observations of X. Finally, contemporaneous exogeniety considers only 
assumption with regards to current values of X. A consideration as to what estimator should be 
chosen with respect to the features and nature of the assumptions is important and involves a 
range of issues that seem not expedient to discuss in more details here because of the time and 
space constraints. However, such a brief discussion seems to provide an adequate foundation for 
choosing the appropriate empirical strategy which will be discussed in more details in the next 
section. In particular, the main choice with regards to the empirical strategy that is expected to be 
made is whether fixed or random effect model must be chosen. In line with the discussion so far 
and arguments by Cameron and Trivedi (2005), on the one hand, the fixed effect model is often 
preferred because of weaker assumptions compared to pooled or random effects model, and 
possibility to establish causality relationships for an outcome of interest. On the other hand, a 
fixed effect model is also associated with a number of weaknesses that should be taken into 
account. To be more precise, the fixed effects model usually suffers from „absorbing‟ time 
invariant factors, thus do not allow estimating them. In addition, such problems as imprecision of 
time-invariant estimates and impossibility of conditional mean prediction should be also noted. 
Finally, although it looks like a „rule-of-thumb‟, it can be said that random effects model is 
usually preferred when a number of cross-section observations is large. Therefore, because an 
empirical consideration does not focus on causality issues and a number of observations are 
believed to be sufficiently large, it seems reasonable to apply the random effects model. 
However, in order to ensure that RE model can be adequately applied to the case, the Wu-
Hausman test will be used in the next subsection. 
The final methodological issue that seems to be worth to discuss is a use of an interaction term. 
The interaction term is a multiplication of the explanatory variables which is expected to capture 
a change in the variable`s effect on the outcome variable, depending on the particular variable 
that is used as a multiplier. To be more precise, as it was mentioned earlier, in order to test the 
results presented in the theoretical part, interaction term is required to see how the effect of the 
chosen variables varies with respect to the government effectiveness. Therefore, the product of 
the certain variable with the government effectiveness variable will describe this effect of 
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interest. However, Bedeian and Mossholder (1994) argue that interpretation of the interaction 
term might not be straightforward as it is claimed. In addition, a number of complications arise 
because of the nature of the empirical goal which will be discussed more in the next subsection 
but it can be said now that government effectiveness is not expected to be a factor affecting the 
level of entrepreneurship directly. Instead, it enters the model as a multiplier for a number of 
variables which, according to the model, are dependent on the government effectiveness. It is 
also believed that model is adequately formulated in order to achieve the purpose of the research, 
which will be also addressed using several tests in the next subsection. 
To sum up, this subsection briefly discussed the main issues with regards to methods that will be 
used and discussed in the next subsection. 
 
 
4.3. Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
The previous section was dedicated to an extension and augmentation of the theoretical 
framework which attempts to understand the factors and mechanisms underlying an existence of 
the certain level of entrepreneurial activities within the economy. In particular, the model by 
Kolakez and Legmann (2010) was employed and augmented by means of including into 
consideration institutional factor, taxation, endogenously defined productivity level, capital 
requirements and burdensome costs, which are required to be paid by perspective entrepreneurs 
in order to set up a vacancy. 
The results achieved in the previous section suggest that an ambiguous effect of taxation and 
macroeconomic conditions (interest rate) can be explained by a various quality of institutions, 
which account for an effect that these variables have on the level of entrepreneurial conditions. 
Because the results achieved so far imply only theoretical importance, it seems worth to look at 
empirical validity of these results. In particular, as it was widely discussed in the previous 
subsections of this chapter, it is a panel data approach which is applied in order to obtain the 
results. The data was discussed in more details in the first subsection but it seems worth to 
remind that the following variables presented by the corresponding indicator are used: income 
distribution within the country (Gini coefficient provided by the World Bank database), lending 
interest rate (lending interest rate data provided by the World Bank), corporate tax rate (data 
provided by the World Bank database), personal income tax (data provided by the World Bank 
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database), level of entrepreneurial activities within the country (percentage of adults who own or 
manage business provided by the Global Enterprenrship Monitor) and, finally, government 
effectiveness index which is the average with equal weights of such indexes as estimated 
coefficients on Government Effectiveness and Requlatory Quality provided by the World Bank. 
Therefore, a use of the data and methodology allowed achieving empirical results presented 
below.  
The model to be estimated takes the following form: 
                                                                     
                                         
where           -  a level of entrepreneurial activities; 
           - a ratio of the corporate tax to the personal income tax; 
          - lending interest rate; 
                - income distribution presented by the GINI coefficient; 
             – indicator of quality of institutions and governmental effectiveness 
     - error term 
 
As it is clear from the model presented above, it does not include a government effectiveness 
factor as a separate variable because it is not considered as a factor which has a direct effect on 
the dependent variable but, presumably, plays a crucial role in the effect that other variables, 
except for income distribution, have on the level of entrepreneurial activities within the country. 
In addition, another concern which is related to the quality of government variable is that it 
might be strongly correlated with income distribution because of the historical inheritance. This 
is also the reason why the multiplication of the quality of institutions with income distribution 
variable is not used. In addition, according to the theoretical model, there is no a particular 
mechanism that suggests how the quality of government influences the effect of income 
inequality. In line with an interaction model theory discussed in more details in the previous 
subsection, the main coefficient of interest here is the variables that are multiplications of the 
government effectiveness factors with lending interest rate and tax ratio, and income inequality 
variable. Therefore, coefficients of these variables might confirm the theoretical finding 
presented before. 
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Before conducting the analysis, it seems worth to note that time series properties of the panel 
data are neglected here because it is believed that a time period is fairly short, thus skipping such 
a consideration seems not being crucial for analysis and, moreover, does not seem to be 
expedient due to time and space constraints. Another decision to be made before proceeding to 
the results is a use of fixed/random effects models. In line with the consideration presented in the 
previous subsection which suggests using random effect model, it is required to justify the choice 
using the Wu-Hausman test. All the results for this section are obtained using Stata 12. 
Therefore, the Do-file together with the data is presented in the appendix at the end of the thesis. 
The results of the Wu-Hausman test suggest that we cannot reject a hypothesis that the model 
can be adequately estimated as a random effect model, thus estimator is consistent and more 
efficient compared to a fixed effect estimator, which is consistent only.  
Therefore, the results for the estimated model are presented in the table 4.2 below: 
Table 4.2. Effect of the variables under consideration and institutional quality on a level of 
entrepreneurial activities 
Entrepreneurial 
Activities, %    
Corporate to Personal 
Income Tax Ratio 
 
-0,110 
(1,057) 
 
Lending Interest Rate 
 
 
 
-0,024 
(0,022) 
Income Distribution 
 
 
-0,008 
(0,052) 
 
Interaction Terms 
 
 
 
Corporate to Personal 
Income Tax Ratio * 
Government Effectiveness   
 -2,571*** 
(0,768) 
 
Lending Interest Rate 
* Government 
Effectiveness 
 
-0,064* 
(0,038) 
Constant   9,225*** 
    (2,148) 
N   197 
*p<0,1 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Standard errors within parentheses. 
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The results presented in the table 4.2 can be considered such that support the results obtained 
with the theoretical model in the previous subsection. The shortcomings and possible 
improvements of such results will not be considered within this section. Instead, the focus here 
will remain on the results while the following chapters will pay more attention to the possible 
issues with regards to the conducted analysis. As it was expected, such variables as tax ratio and 
lending interest rate are not significant. The results for the income distribution show that a 
coefficient is insignificant which does not support importance of liquidity constraints which was 
widely concluded and emphasised in the papers discussed in the literature review. However, it is 
predicted by the theoretical model and supported with the results of this subsection that 
interaction variables are significant. Furthermore, the results suggest that higher quality of 
institutions implies a significantly lower effect of the considered tax ratio. Similarly, the results 
show that higher government effectiveness also implies a lower extent to an effect that lending 
interest rate has on the aggregate level of entrepreneurial activities. 
The Shapiro–Wilk test for normality of residuals suggests that residuals are normally distributed 
and do not display excessive skewness or kurtosis. It is also can be concluded from a histogram 
of residuals presented on the figure 4.1: 
 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of residuals 
 
In line with the discussion so far, the model estimated in this section seems to be valid and 
adequately formulated. In addition, it allowed achieving the empirical purpose of the thesis. In 
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particular, it supports a conclusion which stems from the theoretical model presented in the 
previous section. To be more precise, it suggests that entrepreneurship is a complex phenomenon 
and analysis of the level of entrepreneurship on the aggregate level cannot be restricted to 
considering only liquidity constraints or any other factor as a main factor behind a certain level 
of entrepreneurial activities within the economies. In other words, it is also an economic 
environment, which is characterised by government effectiveness, which account for what effect 
is witnessed as a results of changes in any other factors under consideration. Therefore, the next 
chapter will provide a discussion of the contribution that the results obtained so far imply to the 
existing literature which attempts to understand economic factors behind of a particular level of 
entrepreneurial activities within the economy. 
 
 39 
 
5. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION AND DISCUSSION 
 
A discussion so far was focused on extending theoretical understanding of entrepreneurial 
activities on the aggregate level as a rational choice which is fully dependent on the labour 
market conditions. In addition, the purpose also consisted in empirical justification for 
theoretical findings in order to ensure that such a consideration can capture the real-world 
picture. 
In order to achieve the purpose of the research, a wide range of literature has been reviewed and 
referred to within the thesis. Nonetheless, although most of the findings are to some extent based 
on methodology and conclusions published before, the results of the paper also imply a number 
of contributions to the existing literature and, as it is believed, fill the literature gap advertised in 
the introduction. Therefore, this section will focus on the discussion of the contribution of this 
paper to existing literature and possible extensions which are a subject to future research. 
As it was discussed mostly in the literature review, a multitude of works paid attention to the 
entrepreneurship and, in particular, to the factors that influence the level of entrepreneurial 
activities in the society. Therefore, as it was mentioned in the literature review, there is a wide 
range of economic, sociological or psychological factors which to a various extent influence 
expected profitability of entrepreneurial activities. Most of the works in the field of economics 
mostly considered an effect of single factors on the aggregate decision to be a entrepreneur, thus 
affecting entrepreneurial activities. To be more precise, most of the well-known theoretical 
works considered liquidity constraints as a decisive factor. Therefore, such an incomplete 
theoretical picture is considered as a root of inconsistency between the theoretical results and 
empirical evidence. A theoretical model that was presented in the thesis, and, in turn, was based 
on the theoretical attempts by Kolakez and Legmann (2010) to explain importance of the 
liquidity constraints as a main factor which determines the attractiveness of being self-employed. 
The results of this and a number of similar works, which were discussed in the literature review, 
argue that this is an important factor affecting a level of entrepreneurial activities. However, they 
neglect a vast range of other factors and economic features. In addition, a number of works 
clearly emphasised existence of a gap in the literature with regard to the systematic theoretical 
understanding of the entrepreneurship, which is also supported by empirical ambiguity of the 
results. Therefore, this literature gap justifies importance of this research, which, literally, 
attempts to augment a theoretical framework of entrepreneurship as a labour market choice by 
means of including systematic economic features into consideration rather than focusing on 
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particular factor which, as it is hypothesised in this thesis, might have various effects on the 
entrepreneurial incentives depending on the systematic economic features. It is a governmental 
effectiveness which is considered as „systematic economic features‟ in this research. In 
particular, a government, which may be effective or not, affects expected profitability of 
entrepreneurs and workers, who strive to fill the vacancy created by the entrepreneurs, mainly, 
by way of tax collection and government expenditures. As a result, such an extension, with 
regard to the known models on the time of writing this thesis, allows achieving satisfactory 
results in the theoretical and empirical context. In particular, upon solving the model, empirical 
analysis employing panel data framework and including the factors under consideration 
supported the theoretical conclusions. Therefore, it enables considering this as a contribution to 
existing literature in this field in a number of ways.  
Firstly, a consensus between theoretical and empirical views that was achieved in this thesis 
implies that government effectiveness, apart from other factors, is an important factor which 
determines economic environment. In particular, entrepreneurship is sensitive to taxes, 
burdensome procedures and productivity of the vacancies created. However, this sensitivity is to 
a large extent dependent on the government effectiveness. This, in turn, leads to a number of 
subsequent conclusions. In particular, an effective government has larger scopes to rise or reduce 
taxes as long as they are properly invested for the purpose of providing better environment for 
flourishing of entrepreneurial activities such as increasing labour productivity through reducing 
costs of education or decreasing capital required to post a vacancy. In reality, there is a multitude 
of other channels that government can use to increase expected profitability of entrepreneurs but 
they are not included in the model for the purpose of simplification of the analysis.  
Secondly, an effect of taxes is concluded to be ambiguous as it is directly connected to the 
government effectiveness which, as it was mentioned, defines what effect the difference of taxes 
will have on the aggregate decision to become an entrepreneur. 
Finally, leaving the government effectiveness aside, this thesis does not support a theoretically 
grounded hypothesis of the liquidity constraints as a deterministic factor. In particular, empirical 
results did not allow concluding a significant role of income equality and costs of capital 
(lending interest rate) as factors which, to some extent, are considered here as proxies for capital 
constraints that might be faced by the entrepreneurs. Again the effect of lending interest rate is 
also concluded to be dependent on the government effectiveness. 
Despite the contribution of this paper, there are a number of weaknesses and limitations with 
regard to both theoretical and empirical parts of the research, which should be taken into account 
and can be addressed in the further research. Firstly, the theoretical model lacked a number of 
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directions for the government expenditures that might be worth to consider as those which affect 
a level of entrepreneurial activities. In addition, the functional form chosen to achieve theoretical 
results might also affects obtained results. Nevertheless, it is believed that results would not 
change dramatically if another appropriate functional form is chosen
13
. Another issue to consider 
is that the results of the model are, to a limited extent, dependent on the constant values chosen 
for the simulation. Therefore, a unique solution can be achieved only when value functions yield 
to positive values for all the considered range of values. In addition, the relative profitability 
function considered in the model should be also strongly greater than zero. It is also might be 
worth to consider a number of complications such as allowing a tax rate to be progressive with 
respect to the income. However, such issues were not addressed in this thesis due to a different 
purpose and focus of the research. The final point that is worth to note with regard to the 
theoretical model discussed here is related to government effectiveness which is the key variable 
in the analysis. This indicator is assumed to be historically inherited thus is exogenous and not 
interdependent with any other variable in the model. Such an assumption can be criticised as 
being not realistic because, in fact, government effectiveness might be dependent on economic 
conditions. Nonetheless, it is believed that the scopes of the research identified at the beginning 
of the thesis enable suggesting that this assumption does not distort the real picture and the 
obtained results remain valid. 
Another kind of issues, which are important to mention, relates to the empirical analysis 
conducted within the thesis. In particular, one of the obvious weaknesses of the data used is a 
number of missing observations that certainly reduced the power of the results. Nevertheless, 
such missing observations are considered as random and amount to insignificant share of total 
observations, thus do not seem to be a point for a serious concern. Another possible worry 
mentioned earlier relates to a use of an interaction term as it is claimed to be difficult to interpret. 
However, as it was also mentioned earlier, such specification of the model seems to be 
reasonable to achieve the results and interpretation based on the previous theoretical discussion. 
Furthermore, these concerns do not imply inadequacy of the analysis especially taken into 
account that no problems were found with regard to the error term distribution. 
To sum up, the results obtained in this thesis are expected to bear theoretical importance for 
understanding behavioural patterns underlying existence of a certain level of entrepreneurial 
activities in economy. The results of the empirical analysis support the results obtained in the 
theoretical part of the research. In particular, insignificant coefficients for the tax ratio, lending 
                                                 
13
 The functional form should satisfy the requirements with respect to being increasing/decreasing and 
convex/concave correspondingly to the factor under consideration. 
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interest rate and GINI coefficient of income inequality support that these variables are unlikely 
to have unambiguous effect on the aggregate level of entrepreneurial activities. Furthermore, as 
it was suggested in the theoretical section, it is quality of government that account for such 
ambiguity. In other words, changes which are witnessed as a result of changes mentioned 
variables are dependent on the quality of government or regulations. Therefore, it can be 
considered as a contribution to the defined gap in the existing literature. The results are 
considered to be valid after the critical assessment of the conducted research. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
An ambiguous nature of entrepreneurship in terms of the consequences that it implies to the 
social and economic development is even less ambiguous than factors which account for the 
entrepreneurship on the aggregate level. Therefore, a number of works discussed the 
entrepreneurship and a level of entrepreneurial activities in the context of public economics, 
macroeconomics, development economics, psychology, sociology, etc. However, as this research 
argues, this is a systematic approach that was lacking in the analysis conducted within the 
previous works. A clear example was cited by the Storey and Greene (2008) who argue that most 
of the works in the field of entrepreneurship studies, which focused on a particular aspect of the 
entrepreneurial incentives or obstacles, are unlikely to get us much closer to the reality. In line 
with this gap in the literature, it is believed in this thesis that inconsistency among various 
theoretical approaches and empirical considerations might be a result of inability to include 
governmental or institutional effectiveness into analysis, which are considered as „full 
synonyms‟ here. In other words, this is the factor which, to a large extent, is responsible for the 
effect that a particular policy measure would have on the aggregate level incentives to manage 
the business, thus to create work places and to hire those who, because of the personal 
conditions, are better off being employed as workers. As a result, it brings about existence of a 
certain level of entrepreneurial activities within the economy. 
In line with the initial hypothesis that this is the government effectiveness which should be 
considered as a crucially important factor, it seemed expedient to structure the analyse such that 
provides a theoretical model which can explain a mechanism underlying the aggregate level of 
entrepreneurial activities as an alternative to an aggregate level of employment. On the other 
hand, a widely mentioned mismatch between the theory and empirical conclusion poses a 
requirement to conduct the theoretical analysis along with empirical, which would support or 
reject the initial hypothesis of the research.  
Therefore, in order to achieve the purpose of the analysis, it was required to choose the 
theoretical framework that would enable achieving the theoretical results. The fact that this thesis 
considers the entrepreneurship as an alternative occupation to being a worker, it is a matching 
model approach that seems to be promising enough to proceed further in the analysis, since it 
considers not only monetary incentives but also accounts for labour market conditions which are 
hypothesised to play an important role. The history of the matching model approach started from 
Pissarides saw a multitude of different works, partially discussed in the literature review, which 
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based the research on this foundation. However, the literature review, which previously 
contributed to the identification of the gap in the literature expected to be filled as a result of the 
thesis, suggested the model by Kolakez, Legmann (2010) as an ideal foundation to achieve the 
results. The original model was mainly used to understand how liquidity constraints affect the 
decision to become an entrepreneur. Although the model was not originally suitable for the 
analysis aimed to be conducted, it was possible to extend the model by means of a number of 
augmentations. As results, it was shown that it is a governmental or institutional factor that can 
account for the mentioned absence of the consensus. In particularly, depending on the 
government effectiveness, different forms of taxation and capital constraints may have 
dramatically different outcomes.  
As it was mentioned before, such results do not seem to have any importance as a contribution to 
the existing literature if they do not help to understand the underlying real world processes. 
Therefore, the empirical analysis using paned data and including various countries with various 
quality of the government for a period of time from 2002 to 2012 was to be required. The results 
supported the conclusion formulated upon solving the theoretical model. To be more precise, 
such factors as taxation (labour and corporate), wealth inequality and costs of capital lending 
might have radically different effects on the level of entrepreneurial activities within the 
economy as the outcome of interest. Furthermore, this effect, to a large extent, is dependent on 
the quality of government that exists in the country and, which defines the „rules of the game‟. 
Such results stem, mainly, from insignificant coefficients for all the variables and significant 
coefficients of the interaction terms which denote the effect of government effectiveness on the 
effect that a particular variable have on the aggregate level of entrepreneurship. 
It is clear that the relationships discussed in this thesis are much more complex mainly due to 
endogeniety issue that roots in the fact that government effectiveness is also affected by a 
number of factors. Nonetheless, the results are concluded to be valid despite such exogeniety 
simplifications and, therefore, it can be considered that the purpose of the thesis was achieved 
since the initially formulated hypothesis was not rejected within the theoretical and empirical 
contexts. 
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Appendix 1. Do-file 
 
xtset c_code Year 
 
gen tax_dif = corp_tax/lab_tax 
gen tax_s = corp_tax + lab_tax 
 
gen tax_dif_qual_inst = tax_dif * qual_inst 
gen lend_i_qual_inst = lend_i * qual_inst 
gen incom_distr_qual_inst = incom_distr * qual_inst 
gen tax_s_qual_inst = incom_distr * tax_s 
 
summarize gov_eff reg_qual qual_inst enterp corp_tax lab_tax incom_distr tax_dif 
 
xtreg enterp tax_dif lend_i incom_distr incom_distr_qual_inst tax_dif_qual_inst lend_i_qual_inst, fe 
estimate store fixed 
xtreg enterp tax_dif lend_i incom_distr incom_distr_qual_inst tax_dif_qual_inst lend_i_qual_inst, re 
estimate store random 
hausman fixed random 
 
xtreg enterp tax_dif lend_i incom_distr tax_dif_qual_inst lend_i_qual_inst, re 
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outreg using reg_module1, replace se title("Effect of the variables under consideration and institutiona quality on level of enterpreneurship") 
predict ent_hat 
gen res = enterp - ent_hat 
swilk res 
sktest res 
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Appendix 2. Data 
 
N Country Year Government Effectiveness Regulatory Quality Quality of Institutions Level of Entrepreneurship Corporate Tax Labour tax Lending Interest Rate GINI coefficient 
1 Algeria 2012 
   
3,3 40 35 8 
 1 Algeria 2011 -0,65544 -1,15811 -0,90677 3,1 40 35 8 
 1 Algeria 2010 -0,56203 -1,13643 -0,84923 
 
40 35 8 
 1 Algeria 2009 -0,65712 -1,04144 -0,84928 4,7 40 35 8 
 1 Algeria 2008 -0,65093 -0,79631 -0,72362 
 
40 35 8 
 1 Algeria 2007 -0,64134 -0,62047 -0,63091 
 
40 35 8 
 1 Algeria 2006 -0,56376 -0,57565 -0,56971 
 
40 35 8 
 1 Algeria 2005 -0,43737 -0,43402 -0,43569 
 
40 35 8 
 1 Algeria 2004 -0,52093 -0,54495 -0,53294 
 
40 35 8 
 1 Algeria 2003 -0,61475 -0,55109 -0,58292 
 
40 35 8,125 
 1 Algeria 2002 -0,61492 -0,5939 -0,60441 
 
40 35 8,5833 
 2 Angola 2012 
   
9,1 35 17 16,7 
 2 Angola 2011 -1,14517 -1,1026 -1,12389 
 
35 17 18,8 
 2 Angola 2010 -1,12292 -1,03701 -1,07996 8,6 35 17 22,5 
 2 Angola 2009 -0,97656 -1,03762 -1,00709 
 
35 15 15,7 42,7 
2 Angola 2008 -1,07131 -1,06091 -1,06611 4,1 35 15 12,5336 
 2 Angola 2007 -1,23727 -1,04876 -1,14302 
 
35 15 17,6988 
 2 Angola 2006 -1,37154 -1,13631 -1,25393 
 
35 15 19,5108 
 2 Angola 2005 -1,16884 -1,28809 -1,22847 
 
35 15 67,7181 
 2 Angola 2004 -1,2846 -1,24638 -1,26549 
 
35 15 82,3342 
 2 Angola 2003 -1,13841 -1,23314 -1,18578 
 
35 15 96,115 
 2 Angola 2002 -1,25417 -1,48707 -1,37062 
 
35 15 97,3358 58,64 
3 Argentina 2012 
   
9,6 35 35 14,1 
 3 Argentina 2011 -0,15906 -0,73555 -0,44731 11,8 35 35 14,1 
 3 Argentina 2010 -0,21131 -0,75503 -0,48317 12,4 35 35 10,6 44,5 
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3 Argentina 2009 -0,34551 -0,84365 -0,59458 13,5 35 35 15,7 46,1 
3 Argentina 2008 -0,12283 -0,72772 -0,42527 13,5 35 35 19,4682 46,3 
3 Argentina 2007 -0,02786 -0,68579 -0,35682 10 35 35 11,052 47,4 
3 Argentina 2006 -0,03285 -0,64936 -0,3411 7 35 35 8,6269 47,7 
3 Argentina 2005 -0,08829 -0,56762 -0,32795 5 35 35 6,1632 49,3 
3 Argentina 2004 -0,02051 -0,69181 -0,35616 8,06 35 35 82,3342 50,2 
3 Argentina 2003 -0,00951 -0,71932 -0,36442 7,84 35 35 19,1462 54,7 
3 Argentina 2002 -0,26004 -0,93764 -0,59884 10,78 35 35 51,6788 53,8 
4 Australia 2012 
    
30 45 7 35,2 
4 Australia 2011 1,739433 1,789629 1,764531 9,1 30 45 7,7 35,2 
4 Australia 2010 1,814114 1,638126 1,72612 8,5 30 45 7,3 35,2 
4 Australia 2009 1,750799 1,770497 1,760648 
 
30 45 6 35,2 
4 Australia 2008 1,780872 1,756162 1,768517 
 
30 45 8,9083 35,2 
4 Australia 2007 1,823371 1,673533 1,748452 
 
30 45 8,1958 35,2 
4 Australia 2006 1,758561 1,617078 1,687819 9,1 30 47 9,4125 35,2 
4 Australia 2005 1,765651 1,597923 1,681787 10,4 30 47 9,0583 35,2 
4 Australia 2004 2,038821 1,734342 1,886582 9,64 30 47 8,85 35,2 
4 Australia 2003 1,814809 1,584026 1,699417 9,12 30 47 8,4125 35,2 
4 Australia 2002 1,697198 1,444242 1,57072 7,71 30 47 8,1625 35,2 
5 Austria 2012 
   
7,6 25 50 
 
29,2 
5 Austria 2011 1,660707 1,414109 1,537408 
 
25 50 
 
29,2 
5 Austria 2010 1,884996 1,528125 1,706561 
 
25 50 
 
29,2 
5 Austria 2009 1,722385 1,516825 1,619605 
 
25 50 
 
29,2 
5 Austria 2008 1,7677 1,60623 1,686965 
 
25 50 
 
29,2 
5 Austria 2007 1,863715 1,706422 1,785069 6 25 50 
 
29,2 
5 Austria 2006 1,81783 1,65482 1,736325 
 
25 50 
 
29,2 
5 Austria 2005 1,720302 1,618364 1,669333 3,8 25 50 
 
29,2 
5 Austria 2004 1,909839 1,544744 1,727291 
 
34 50 
 
29,2 
5 Austria 2003 2,018822 1,543268 1,781045 
 
34 50 
 
29,2 
5 Austria 2002 1,965897 1,564841 1,765369 
 
34 50 
 
29,2 
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6 Belgium 2012 
   
5,1 34 50 
 
33 
6 Belgium 2011 1,66664 1,252731 1,459685 6,8 34 50 
 
33 
6 Belgium 2010 1,589819 1,275477 1,432648 2,7 34 50 
 
33 
6 Belgium 2009 1,589543 1,309744 1,449644 2,5 34 50 9,5 33 
6 Belgium 2008 1,3843 1,391906 1,388103 2,6 34 50 9,2083 33 
6 Belgium 2007 1,605324 1,414243 1,509784 1,4 34 50 8,5708 33 
6 Belgium 2006 1,710647 1,317784 1,514216 2,1 34 50 7,4917 33 
6 Belgium 2005 1,736865 1,247851 1,492358 5,6 34 50 6,7208 33 
6 Belgium 2004 1,920938 1,366921 1,64393 4,03 34 50 6,7 33 
6 Belgium 2003 1,95968 1,288451 1,624065 2,21 34 50 6,8875 33 
6 Belgium 2002 1,986018 1,278929 1,632474 2,24 40,2 50 7,7083 33 
7 Bolivia 2012 
    
25 13 11,1 
 7 Bolivia 2011 -0,41484 -0,74583 -0,58034 
 
25 13 10,9 
 7 Bolivia 2010 -0,45126 -0,77567 -0,61346 18,2 25 13 9,9 
 7 Bolivia 2009 -0,53026 -0,83076 -0,68051 
 
25 13 12,4 
 7 Bolivia 2008 -0,65608 -0,87251 -0,76429 19,1 25 13 13,8733 56,3 
7 Bolivia 2007 -0,59573 -0,98106 -0,7884 
 
25 13 12,8608 57,4 
7 Bolivia 2006 -0,67196 -0,86707 -0,76952 
 
25 13 11,8913 56,4 
7 Bolivia 2005 -0,68016 -0,62872 -0,65444 
 
25 13 16,615 57,8 
7 Bolivia 2004 -0,54566 -0,17772 -0,36169 
 
25 13 14,4699 
 7 Bolivia 2003 -0,27666 -0,05778 -0,16722 
 
25 13 17,6633 
 7 Bolivia 2002 -0,29114 -0,05025 -0,17069 
 
25 13 20,6325 59,9 
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012 
   
6 10 10 6,9 
 8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 -0,76009 -0,04159 -0,40084 5 10 10 7,4 
 8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 -0,7265 -0,10145 -0,41398 6,6 10 10 7,9 
 8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 -0,68943 -0,10183 -0,39563 3,9 10 5 7,9 
 8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008 -0,57476 -0,16637 -0,37056 8,7 10 5 6,9783 
 8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 -0,80033 -0,26305 -0,53169 
 
30 5 7,1725 36,2 
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006 -0,59784 -0,42844 -0,51314 
 
30 5 8,0142 
 8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005 -0,71727 -0,4911 -0,60418 
 
30 5 9,6125 
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8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004 -0,5666 -0,19077 -0,37869 
 
30 5 10,2817 35,8 
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 -0,77409 -0,47866 -0,62637 
 
30 5 10,87 
 8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002 -0,97077 -0,55947 -0,76512 
 
30 5 12,6985 28 
9 Brazil 2012 
   
15,2 34 27,5 36,6 
 9 Brazil 2011 -0,00852 0,166335 0,078906 12,2 34 27,5 43,9 
 9 Brazil 2010 0,070938 0,169004 0,119971 15,3 34 27,5 40 
 9 Brazil 2009 0,022423 0,135499 0,078961 11,8 34 27,5 44,7 54,7 
9 Brazil 2008 -0,0193 0,044074 0,012386 14,6 34 27,5 47,25 55,1 
9 Brazil 2007 -0,12799 -0,04564 -0,08682 9,9 34 27,5 43,7167 55,9 
9 Brazil 2006 -0,16368 -0,05768 -0,11068 12,1 34 27,5 50,8083 56,8 
9 Brazil 2005 -0,09933 0,041074 -0,02913 10,1 34 27,5 55,3833 57,4 
9 Brazil 2004 0,066151 0,054642 0,060397 10,11 34 27,5 54,925 57,7 
9 Brazil 2003 0,179733 0,313235 0,246484 7,62 34 27,5 67,0833 58,8 
9 Brazil 2002 0,033569 0,286739 0,160154 7,76 34 27,5 62,875 59,4 
10 Chile 2012 
   
7,8 20 40 10,1 
 10 Chile 2011 1,172877 1,538325 1,355601 7 20 40 9 
 10 Chile 2010 1,177217 1,472577 1,324897 6 17 40 4,8 
 10 Chile 2009 1,146691 1,495347 1,321019 6,7 17 40 7,3 52,1 
10 Chile 2008 1,180647 1,535102 1,357875 6,8 17 40 13,2618 
 10 Chile 2007 1,266378 1,480556 1,373467 8,7 17 40 8,6713 
 10 Chile 2006 1,126649 1,457582 1,292116 6,8 17 40 7,9995 51,8 
10 Chile 2005 1,21647 1,425055 1,320763 3,8 17 40 6,6779 
 10 Chile 2004 1,200185 1,427898 1,314042 
 
17 40 5,127 
 10 Chile 2003 1,235814 1,469457 1,352636 6,46 16,5 40 6,1788 54,6 
10 Chile 2002 1,136118 1,442992 1,289555 6,79 16 40 7,7581 55,3 
11 China 2012 
   
12,5 25 45 6 
 11 China 2011 0,119377 -0,20318 -0,0419 12,7 25 45 6,6 
 11 China 2010 0,122686 -0,2071 -0,04221 13,8 25 45 5,8 
 11 China 2009 0,13475 -0,19286 -0,02905 17,2 25 45 5,3 42,1 
11 China 2008 0,191362 -0,14123 0,025065 
 
25 45 5,31 42,6 
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11 China 2007 0,224692 -0,16023 0,032231 8,4 33 45 7,47 
 11 China 2006 0,11791 -0,19339 -0,03774 12,9 33 45 6,12 
 11 China 2005 -0,09212 -0,13197 -0,11204 13,2 33 45 5,58 42,5 
11 China 2004 0,00011 -0,27516 -0,13753 
 
33 45 5,58 
 11 China 2003 -0,03823 -0,33689 -0,18756 16,38 33 45 5,31 
 11 China 2002 -0,0514 -0,53062 -0,29101 10,07 33 45 5,31 42,6 
12 Colombia 2012 
   
6,7 33 33 12,6 
 12 Colombia 2011 0,244031 0,353496 0,298764 7,5 33 33 11,2 
 12 Colombia 2010 0,142876 0,241222 0,192049 12,2 33 33 9,4 55,9 
12 Colombia 2009 -0,02408 0,127358 0,05164 12,6 33 33 13 56,7 
12 Colombia 2008 -0,00549 0,257444 0,125975 14,1 33 33 17,1756 57,2 
12 Colombia 2007 -0,02622 0,23839 0,106087 11,6 34 34 15,3819 58,9 
12 Colombia 2006 -0,09746 0,128626 0,01558 10,4 35 38,5 12,8939 58,9 
12 Colombia 2005 -0,16276 0,061898 -0,05043 
 
35 38,5 14,5608 56,1 
12 Colombia 2004 -0,13768 -0,01721 -0,07744 
 
35 35 15,0831 58,3 
12 Colombia 2003 -0,13694 -0,07836 -0,10765 
 
35 35 15,1871 57,9 
12 Colombia 2002 -0,40794 0,0231 -0,19242 
 
35 35 16,3268 60,7 
13 Croatia 2012 
   
3,1 20 40 9,5 
 13 Croatia 2011 0,554 0,557054 0,555527 4,2 20 40 9,7 
 13 Croatia 2010 0,619324 0,552206 0,585765 2,9 20 45 10,4 
 13 Croatia 2009 0,60599 0,546994 0,576492 4,8 20 45 11,6 
 13 Croatia 2008 0,579382 0,492044 0,535713 4,8 20 45 10,0692 33,7 
13 Croatia 2007 0,476651 0,45415 0,4654 4,2 20 45 9,3308 
 13 Croatia 2006 0,565131 0,379386 0,472259 4,1 20 45 9,333 
 13 Croatia 2005 0,479289 0,488581 0,483935 3,7 20 45 11,1911 
 13 Croatia 2004 0,473094 0,540879 0,506986 2,1 20 45 11,7452 29 
13 Croatia 2003 0,37844 0,480888 0,429664 2,5 20 45 11,5767 
 13 Croatia 2002 0,336924 0,29761 0,317267 2,2 20 45 12,84 31,1 
14 Czech Republic 2012 
    
19 15 5,4 
 14 Czech Republic 2011 1,018404 1,251802 1,135103 5,2 19 15 5,7 25,8 
 55 
 
14 Czech Republic 2010 1,002204 1,269477 1,135841 
 
19 15 5,9 25,8 
14 Czech Republic 2009 0,978374 1,293875 1,136124 
 
20 15 6 25,8 
14 Czech Republic 2008 1,001254 1,160746 1,081 
 
21 15 6,2517 25,8 
14 Czech Republic 2007 0,897602 1,032821 0,965211 
 
24 32 5,7884 25,8 
14 Czech Republic 2006 1,056379 1,111003 1,083691 5,4 24 32 5,5973 25,8 
14 Czech Republic 2005 0,966202 1,117075 1,041639 
 
26 32 5,7767 25,8 
14 Czech Republic 2004 0,905102 1,083027 0,994064 
 
28 32 6,0275 25,8 
14 Czech Republic 2003 0,89116 1,184438 1,037799 
 
31 32 5,9492 25,8 
14 Czech Republic 2002 0,965963 1,185665 1,075814 
 
31 32 6,7242 25,8 
15 Denmark 2012 
   
3,4 25 55,4 
  15 Denmark 2011 2,170198 1,931577 2,050887 4,9 25 55,4 
 
24,7 
15 Denmark 2010 2,163527 1,900514 2,03202 5,6 25 55,4 
 
24,7 
15 Denmark 2009 2,292006 1,909966 2,100986 4,7 25 62,3 
 
24,7 
15 Denmark 2008 2,227589 1,888232 2,057911 4,4 25 62,3 
 
24,7 
15 Denmark 2007 2,34432 1,92328 2,1338 6 25 59 
 
24,7 
15 Denmark 2006 2,251133 1,810402 2,030768 5,3 28 59 
 
24,7 
15 Denmark 2005 2,140622 1,673747 1,907185 4,4 28 59 
 
24,7 
15 Denmark 2004 2,344899 1,780683 2,062791 5,06 30 59 
 
24,7 
15 Denmark 2003 2,16178 1,763772 1,962776 5,66 30 59 
 
24,7 
15 Denmark 2002 2,096022 1,752214 1,924118 5,52 30 59 7,1 24,7 
16 Dominica 2012 
    
29 25 15,5 
 16 Dominica 2011 0,611447 0,243159 0,427303 
 
25 25 15,6 
 16 Dominica 2010 0,65533 0,429628 0,542479 
 
25 25 12,1 47,2 
16 Dominica 2009 0,616379 0,517578 0,566979 11,4 25 25 18,1 48,9 
16 Dominica 2008 0,541477 0,553423 0,54745 8,2 25 25 19,945 49 
16 Dominica 2007 0,517159 0,797495 0,657327 7,6 25 29 15,8267 48,7 
16 Dominica 2006 0,482642 0,928691 0,705666 
 
30 30 19,475 51,9 
16 Dominica 2005 0,429245 0,731488 0,580366 
 
25 25 24,1092 51,1 
16 Dominica 2004 0,120757 0,58579 0,353274 
 
25 25 32,6342 52 
16 Dominica 2003 0,221354 0,786568 0,503961 
 
25 25 31,3917 52,1 
 56 
 
16 Dominica 2002 0,424501 0,679928 0,552215 
 
25 25 26,055 50,1 
17 Ecuador 2012 
   
18,9 23 35 
  17 Ecuador 2011 -0,54845 -1,01751 -0,78298 
 
24 35 
  17 Ecuador 2010 -0,67435 -1,1557 -0,91503 14,7 25 35 
 
49,3 
17 Ecuador 2009 -0,72827 -1,27669 -1,00248 16,1 25 35 
 
49,4 
17 Ecuador 2008 -0,84409 -1,12735 -0,98572 11,9 25 35 
 
50,6 
17 Ecuador 2007 -0,84334 -1,11082 -0,97708 
 
25 25 14,93 54,3 
17 Ecuador 2006 -0,97192 -1,06899 -1,02046 
 
25 25 9,8064 52,3 
17 Ecuador 2005 -0,91683 -0,81028 -0,86355 
 
25 25 9,6195 54,1 
17 Ecuador 2004 -0,85061 -0,7023 -0,77645 10,1 25 25 9,9501 
 17 Ecuador 2003 -0,83396 -0,66935 -0,75165 
 
25 25 13,64 55,1 
17 Ecuador 2002 -0,85752 -0,67472 -0,76612 
 
25 25 15,813 
 18 Finland 2012 
   
8 24,5 49 
  18 Finland 2011 2,246964 1,77298 2,009972 8,8 26 49,2 
 
26,9 
18 Finland 2010 2,237616 1,82912 2,033368 9,4 26 49,6 
 
26,9 
18 Finland 2009 2,228277 1,782306 2,005291 8,5 26 49,8 
 
26,9 
18 Finland 2008 2,035639 1,621701 1,82867 9,2 26 50,7 
 
26,9 
18 Finland 2007 1,964855 1,554608 1,759732 7,6 26 51 
 
26,9 
18 Finland 2006 2,124252 1,627803 1,876027 8,2 26 51,4 
 
26,9 
18 Finland 2005 2,157755 1,690633 1,924194 8,6 26 53,5 
 
26,9 
18 Finland 2004 2,21022 1,812196 2,011208 7,5 29 53,5 3,6889 26,9 
18 Finland 2003 2,264352 1,86238 2,063366 7,5 29 53,5 4,13 26,9 
18 Finland 2002 2,169184 1,853848 2,011516 8,5 29 53,5 4,821 26,9 
19 France 2012 
   
3,2 34,4 45 
  19 France 2011 1,364101 1,109965 1,237033 2,4 34,4 41 
 
32,7 
19 France 2010 1,438733 1,312423 1,375578 2,4 34,4 41 
 
32,7 
19 France 2009 1,475326 1,217626 1,346476 3,2 34,4 40 
 
32,7 
19 France 2008 1,582725 1,274666 1,428696 2,8 34,4 40 
 
32,7 
19 France 2007 1,480006 1,276224 1,378115 1,7 34,4 40 
 
32,7 
19 France 2006 1,582872 1,222522 1,402697 1,3 34,4 40 
 
32,7 
 57 
 
19 France 2005 1,706714 1,220794 1,463754 2,3 35 48,1 
 
32,7 
19 France 2004 1,81469 1,231117 1,522904 1,45 35,4 48,1 6,6 32,7 
19 France 2003 1,723194 1,216454 1,469824 1,51 35,4 48,1 6,6 32,7 
19 France 2002 1,601053 0,986699 1,293876 1,27 35,4 48,1 6 32,7 
20 Germany 2012 
   
5 15,825 45 3,9 
 20 Germany 2011 1,533604 1,51162 1,522612 5,6 15,825 45 4 28,3 
20 Germany 2010 1,552398 1,576689 1,564543 5,7 15,825 45 3,3 28,3 
20 Germany 2009 1,571719 1,525017 1,548368 5,1 15,825 45 6,4 28,3 
20 Germany 2008 1,554853 1,470221 1,512537 4 15,825 45 6,5 28,3 
20 Germany 2007 1,662619 1,597332 1,629976 
 
21,9 45 5,7 28,3 
20 Germany 2006 1,646714 1,54635 1,596532 3 21,9 42 4,5 28,3 
20 Germany 2005 1,543406 1,493509 1,518458 4,2 21,9 42 4,5 28,3 
20 Germany 2004 1,534746 1,490477 1,512611 4,31 21,9 45 4,5 28,3 
20 Germany 2003 1,401347 1,510705 1,456026 4,64 23,2 45 5,5 28,3 
20 Germany 2002 1,720683 1,544483 1,632583 4,83 21,9 45 9,02 28,3 
21 Greece 2012 
   
12,3 20 45 
  21 Greece 2011 0,478029 0,509778 0,493903 15,8 20 45 
  21 Greece 2010 0,520179 0,651411 0,585795 14,8 24 45 
  21 Greece 2009 0,582086 0,822434 0,70226 15,1 25 40 
  21 Greece 2008 0,644187 0,857823 0,751005 12,6 25 40 
  21 Greece 2007 0,621718 0,876112 0,748915 13,3 25 40 
  21 Greece 2006 0,724193 0,824184 0,774189 8,2 29 40 
  21 Greece 2005 0,71894 0,926647 0,822794 10,5 32 40 
  21 Greece 2004 0,83441 0,85545 0,84493 6,54 35 40 
  21 Greece 2003 0,749383 0,997967 0,873675 19,61 35 40 6,7858 
 21 Greece 2002 0,771846 0,972952 0,872399 
 
35 40 7,4133 34,3 
22 Guatemala 2012 
   
5,1 31 31 13,4867 
 22 Guatemala 2011 -0,70062 -0,12914 -0,41488 2,5 31 31 13,43 
 22 Guatemala 2010 -0,70471 -0,15395 -0,42933 6,6 31 31 13,3417 
 22 Guatemala 2009 -0,68694 -0,14283 -0,41489 3,3 31 31 13,8492 
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22 Guatemala 2008 -0,53474 -0,1669 -0,35082 
 
31 31 13,3917 
 22 Guatemala 2007 -0,52244 -0,20756 -0,365 
 
31 31 12,8367 
 22 Guatemala 2006 -0,57712 -0,21412 -0,39562 
 
31 31 12,7625 55,9 
22 Guatemala 2005 -0,69747 -0,39353 -0,5455 
 
31 31 13,0333 
 22 Guatemala 2004 -0,64077 -0,18568 -0,41323 
 
31 31 13,8108 54,5 
22 Guatemala 2003 -0,4475 -0,34075 -0,39412 
 
31 31 14,9783 56,1 
22 Guatemala 2002 -0,49322 -0,16104 -0,32713 
 
31 31 16,8642 59,2 
23 Hungary 2012 
   
8,1 19 16 9,0093 
 23 Hungary 2011 0,705322 1,046198 0,87576 2 19 16 8,3204 
 23 Hungary 2010 0,696964 1,031902 0,864433 5,4 19 32 7,5869 
 23 Hungary 2009 0,701452 1,091916 0,896684 6,7 20 36 11,0369 
 23 Hungary 2008 0,760565 1,187227 0,973896 5,3 20 36 10,1817 
 23 Hungary 2007 0,760218 1,185349 0,972784 4,8 20 36 9,0859 31,2 
23 Hungary 2006 0,904314 1,205287 1,054801 6,7 17,3 36 8,0794 
 23 Hungary 2005 0,79512 1,112534 0,953827 2 16 38 8,5409 
 23 Hungary 2004 0,898782 1,176149 1,037465 2,18 16 38 12,8245 30 
23 Hungary 2003 0,961751 1,118526 1,040139 
 
18 38 9,6034 
 23 Hungary 2002 1,020237 1,310162 1,165199 5,48 18 38 10,1689 26,8 
24 Iceland 2012 
    
20,0 46,2 8,3243 
 24 Iceland 2011 1,566826 1,011414 1,28912 
 
20,0 46,2 7,6981 39,2 
24 Iceland 2010 1,578167 0,890104 1,234136 7,4 18,0 46,1 10,257 39,2 
24 Iceland 2009 1,646038 1,012473 1,329256 8,9 15,0 37,2 18,9877 39,2 
24 Iceland 2008 1,816057 1,334546 1,575301 7,1 15,0 35,7 20,1433 39,2 
24 Iceland 2007 1,789401 1,516783 1,653092 8,8 18,0 35,7 19,2908 39,2 
24 Iceland 2006 1,864736 1,555534 1,710135 6,7 18,0 36,7 17,909 39,2 
24 Iceland 2005 1,994875 1,60901 1,801942 7,3 18,0 24,8 14,7775 39,2 
24 Iceland 2004 2,124655 1,641451 1,883053 7,3 18,0 25,8 12,0167 39,2 
24 Iceland 2003 2,120046 1,644171 1,882108 7,3 18,0 
 
11,95 39,2 
24 Iceland 2002 2,010376 1,514409 1,762393 10,4 18,0 
 
15,3667 39,2 
25 India 2012 
    
32,45 30 10,6042 
 
 59 
 
25 India 2011 -0,02877 -0,34012 -0,18445 
 
33,22 30 10,1667 
 25 India 2010 -0,00767 -0,3891 -0,19839 
 
33,99 30 8,3333 33,9 
25 India 2009 -0,01951 -0,32197 -0,17074 
 
33,99 30 12,1875 
 25 India 2008 -0,02698 -0,35824 -0,19261 16,5 33,99 30 13,3125 
 25 India 2007 0,109447 -0,26465 -0,0776 5,5 33,99 30 13,0208 
 25 India 2006 -0,04141 -0,23093 -0,13617 5,6 33,66 30 11,1875 
 25 India 2005 -0,08404 -0,24292 -0,16348 
 
36,59 30 10,75 33,4 
25 India 2004 -0,10433 -0,39915 -0,25174 
 
36,59 30 10,9167 
 25 India 2003 -0,07079 -0,36484 -0,21782 
 
36,75 30 11,4583 
 25 India 2002 -0,13083 -0,37928 -0,25506 12,1 36,75 30 11,9167 
 26 Iran 2012 
   
9,5 25 35 
  26 Iran 2011 -0,46234 -1,6822 -1,07227 11,2 25 35 11 
 26 Iran 2010 -0,50221 -1,68685 -1,09453 12,2 25 35 12 
 26 Iran 2009 -0,60617 -1,72578 -1,16598 6,5 25 35 12 
 26 Iran 2008 -0,60135 -1,60922 -1,10528 6,8 25 35 12 
 26 Iran 2007 -0,58974 -1,56208 -1,07591 
 
25 35 12 
 26 Iran 2006 -0,57088 -1,45999 -1,01544 
 
25 35 14 
 26 Iran 2005 -0,62103 -1,28455 -0,95279 
 
25 35 16 38,3 
26 Iran 2004 -0,4455 -1,26225 -0,85387 
 
25 35 16,65 
 26 Iran 2003 -0,45506 -1,22744 -0,84125 
 
25 35 
  26 Iran 2002 -0,51901 -1,31932 -0,91917 
 
25 35 
  27 Ireland 2012 
   
8,3 12,5 48 
  27 Ireland 2011 1,421047 1,64725 1,534148 8 12,5 48 
 
34,3 
27 Ireland 2010 1,311354 1,660784 1,486069 8,6 12,5 47 
 
34,3 
27 Ireland 2009 1,31796 1,739373 1,528667 
 
12,5 46 
 
34,3 
27 Ireland 2008 1,526266 1,924115 1,725191 9 12,5 41 
 
34,3 
27 Ireland 2007 1,596159 1,852915 1,724537 9 12,5 41 
 
34,3 
27 Ireland 2006 1,615117 1,854016 1,734567 7,8 12,5 42 
 
34,3 
27 Ireland 2005 1,733453 1,535677 1,634565 8,1 12,5 42 2,6475 34,3 
27 Ireland 2004 1,563842 1,602234 1,583038 6,5 12,5 42 2,5658 34,3 
 60 
 
27 Ireland 2003 1,575973 1,618549 1,597261 6,7 12,5 42 2,8458 34,3 
27 Ireland 2002 1,631082 1,762335 1,696708 8 16,0 42 3,8333 34,3 
28 Israel 2012 
   
3,8 25,0 48 5,5515 
 28 Israel 2011 1,203067 1,347615 1,275341 
 
24,0 45 5,9691 39,2 
28 Israel 2010 1,239915 1,245229 1,242572 3,1 25,0 45 4,9648 39,2 
28 Israel 2009 1,13747 1,125448 1,131459 4,3 26,0 46 4,201 39,2 
28 Israel 2008 1,34634 1,168754 1,257547 4,5 27,0 47 6,5842 39,2 
28 Israel 2007 1,265703 1,10423 1,184966 2,4 29,0 48 6,8564 39,2 
28 Israel 2006 1,265471 1,017855 1,141663 
 
31,0 49 8,0892 39,2 
28 Israel 2005 1,083086 0,879104 0,981095 
 
34,0 49 6,7673 39,2 
28 Israel 2004 1,310428 0,846136 1,078282 3,9 35,0 49 7,4505 39,2 
28 Israel 2003 1,245831 0,934805 1,090318 
 
36,0 49 10,6356 39,2 
28 Israel 2002 1,12275 0,954046 1,038398 5,7 36,0 49 9,8729 39,2 
29 Italy 2012 
   
3,3 27,5 43 5,2225 
 29 Italy 2011 0,446745 0,753817 0,600281 
 
27,5 43 4,5992 36 
29 Italy 2010 0,514931 0,868838 0,691884 3,7 27,5 43 4,0317 36 
29 Italy 2009 0,491015 0,925792 0,708404 5,8 27,5 43 4,7567 36 
29 Italy 2008 0,369692 0,912253 0,640973 6,5 27,5 43 6,8373 36 
29 Italy 2007 0,284695 0,884152 0,584424 5,6 33,0 43 6,3347 36 
29 Italy 2006 0,439975 0,909293 0,674634 3 33,0 43 5,6218 36 
29 Italy 2005 0,577066 0,960256 0,768661 6,4 33,0 43 5,3139 36 
29 Italy 2004 0,674691 1,085598 0,880144 4,72 33,0 45 5,5062 36 
29 Italy 2003 0,796111 1,051407 0,923759 2,26 34,0 45 5,8304 36 
29 Italy 2002 0,800663 0,929045 0,864854 3,63 36,0 45 6,5365 36 
30 Jamaica 2012 
    
33,33 25 17,6283 
 30 Jamaica 2011 0,19767 0,328047 0,262858 5,1 33,33 25 19,5093 
 30 Jamaica 2010 0,181567 0,278729 0,230148 6,9 33,33 35 20,4545 
 30 Jamaica 2009 0,188638 0,273583 0,23111 16,3 33,33 25 16,432 
 30 Jamaica 2008 0,281785 0,334895 0,30834 9,1 33,33 25 16,8258 
 30 Jamaica 2007 0,290641 0,313616 0,302128 
 
33,33 25 17,1975 
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30 Jamaica 2006 0,275263 0,262055 0,268659 10,3 33,33 25 17,6425 
 30 Jamaica 2005 -0,08427 0,231206 0,073468 9,5 33,33 25 17,3608 
 30 Jamaica 2004 0,207289 0,21454 0,210915 
 
33,33 25 18,1375 44,5 
30 Jamaica 2003 0,06081 0,247924 0,154367 
 
33,33 25 18,8867 
 30 Jamaica 2002 -0,02206 0,227819 0,102881 
 
33,33 25 18,5017 48,3 
31 Japan 2012 
   
6,1 28,0 50 1,4075 
 31 Japan 2011 1,345518 0,897772 1,121645 8,3 28,0 50 1,5009 
 31 Japan 2010 1,395024 0,983561 1,189292 7,4 28,0 50 1,5983 
 31 Japan 2009 1,334356 1,053328 1,193842 7,8 28,0 50 1,7233 
 31 Japan 2008 1,433992 1,116661 1,275327 7,9 28,0 50 1,9095 
 31 Japan 2007 1,435564 1,114061 1,274812 8,6 28,0 50 1,8833 
 31 Japan 2006 1,536734 1,234423 1,385579 4,8 28,0 50 1,6648 
 31 Japan 2005 1,34534 1,232287 1,288813 5,4 28,0 50 1,6769 
 31 Japan 2004 1,42466 1,141043 1,282851 4,75 28,0 50 1,7666 
 31 Japan 2003 1,224642 1,064259 1,144451 6 27,4 50 1,8221 
 31 Japan 2002 1,070835 0,484142 0,777489 6,81 27,4 50 1,8649 
 32 Korea, South 2012 
   
9,6 24,2 38 5,3958 
 32 Korea, South 2011 1,232367 0,952724 1,092545 10,9 24,2 35 5,7575 31,6 
32 Korea, South 2010 1,188718 0,920402 1,05456 11,2 24,2 35 5,5117 31,6 
32 Korea, South 2009 1,078275 0,824502 0,951389 11,8 24,2 35 5,6492 31,6 
32 Korea, South 2008 1,090204 0,706586 0,898395 12,8 27,5 35 7,1683 31,6 
32 Korea, South 2007 1,254036 0,909611 1,081823 
 
27,5 35 6,5517 31,6 
32 Korea, South 2006 1,080087 0,732046 0,906067 
 
27,5 35 5,9875 31,6 
32 Korea, South 2005 1,019477 0,820714 0,920096 
 
27,5 35 5,5933 31,6 
32 Korea, South 2004 0,943602 0,805812 0,874707 
 
29,7 36 5,9042 31,6 
32 Korea, South 2003 0,925874 0,749134 0,837504 
 
29,7 36 6,2367 31,6 
32 Korea, South 2002 0,886253 0,802902 0,844577 10,2 29,7 36 6,7692 31,6 
33 Latvia 2012 
   
7,9 15,0 25 5,5175 
 33 Latvia 2011 0,68445 0,954622 0,819536 5,7 15,0 25 6,3883 
 33 Latvia 2010 0,697024 0,976619 0,836821 7,6 15,0 26 9,5583 
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33 Latvia 2009 0,606033 0,979364 0,792698 9 15,0 23 16,23 34,8 
33 Latvia 2008 0,562932 1,024651 0,793792 3 15,0 25 11,8525 36,6 
33 Latvia 2007 0,490082 1,005378 0,74773 3,4 15,0 25 10,9092 36,3 
33 Latvia 2006 0,68502 0,99697 0,840995 5,7 15,0 25 7,2925 
 33 Latvia 2005 0,589372 0,940038 0,764705 5 15,0 25 6,1067 
 33 Latvia 2004 0,647434 0,986913 0,817173 
 
15,0 25 7,4483 35,7 
33 Latvia 2003 0,656768 0,95556 0,806164 
 
19,0 25 5,3808 37,7 
33 Latvia 2002 0,543234 0,882993 0,713114 
 
19,0 25 7,9683 35,9 
34 Malaysia 2012 
   
7 25,0 26 4,7858 
 34 Malaysia 2011 0,999484 0,658212 0,828848 5,2 25,0 26 4,915 
 34 Malaysia 2010 1,095226 0,616507 0,855867 7,9 25,0 26 5 
 34 Malaysia 2009 0,959159 0,328502 0,64383 4,3 25,0 27 5,0842 46,2 
34 Malaysia 2008 1,150996 0,371482 0,761239 
 
26,0 28 6,08 
 34 Malaysia 2007 1,239542 0,549869 0,894705 
 
27,0 28 6,4092 46 
34 Malaysia 2006 1,186536 0,566709 0,876622 7,3 28,0 28 6,4858 
 34 Malaysia 2005 1,134693 0,611302 0,872998 
 
28,0 28 5,9525 
 34 Malaysia 2004 1,128076 0,494295 0,811186 
 
28,0 28 6,0458 37,9 
34 Malaysia 2003 1,173958 0,60385 0,888904 
 
25,0 28 6,3008 
 34 Malaysia 2002 0,992513 0,527368 0,759941 
 
25,0 28 6,5283 
 35 Mexico 2012 
   
4,7 30,0 30 4,7308 
 35 Mexico 2011 0,323868 0,348096 0,335982 3 30,0 30 4,9158 
 35 Mexico 2010 0,165828 0,298509 0,232168 
 
30,0 30 5,2867 47,2 
35 Mexico 2009 0,189373 0,269784 0,229578 
 
28,0 28 7,0742 
 35 Mexico 2008 0,170364 0,34215 0,256257 4,9 28,0 28 8,7058 48,3 
35 Mexico 2007 0,164756 0,381391 0,273073 
 
28,0 28 7,5608 
 35 Mexico 2006 0,160355 0,406434 0,283394 2,3 29,0 29 7,5118 48,1 
35 Mexico 2005 0,078956 0,277279 0,178118 1,9 30,0 30 9,695 51,2 
35 Mexico 2004 0,168122 0,44184 0,304981 
 
33,0 33 7,4383 46,1 
35 Mexico 2003 0,225593 0,384508 0,30505 
 
34,0 
 
7,0225 
 35 Mexico 2002 0,250356 0,457741 0,354048 1,5 35,0 
 
8,2108 49,7 
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36 Netherlands 2012 
   
9,5 25,0 52 1,625 
 36 Netherlands 2011 1,790193 1,84492 1,817557 8,7 25,0 52 2 30,9 
36 Netherlands 2010 1,731042 1,794825 1,762933 9 25,5 52 1,75 30,9 
36 Netherlands 2009 1,748422 1,761384 1,754903 8,1 25,5 52 1,9833 30,9 
36 Netherlands 2008 1,686671 1,772919 1,729795 7,2 25,5 52 4,6042 30,9 
36 Netherlands 2007 1,726785 1,799795 1,76329 6,4 25,5 52 4,6042 30,9 
36 Netherlands 2006 1,776527 1,682278 1,729402 6,6 29,6 52 3,5417 30,9 
36 Netherlands 2005 1,949091 1,673423 1,811257 5,7 31,5 52 2,7708 30,9 
36 Netherlands 2004 2,119223 1,79175 1,955486 6,1 34,5 52 2,75 30,9 
36 Netherlands 2003 2,034048 1,743537 1,888792 3,77 34,5 52 3 30,9 
36 Netherlands 2002 2,004474 1,861534 1,933004 4,56 34,5 52 3,9583 30,9 
37 Norway 2012 
   
5,8 28,0 47,8 
  37 Norway 2011 1,762931 1,413244 1,588087 6,6 28,0 47,8 
 
25,8 
37 Norway 2010 1,790514 1,456217 1,623366 6,7 28,0 47,8 
 
25,8 
37 Norway 2009 1,74619 1,419706 1,582948 8,3 28,0 47,8 4,28 25,8 
37 Norway 2008 1,842794 1,414221 1,628508 7,7 28,0 47,8 7,279 25,8 
37 Norway 2007 2,031287 1,361257 1,696272 4,8 28,0 47,8 6,6473 25,8 
37 Norway 2006 1,952566 1,256462 1,604514 6 28,0 47,8 4,7 25,8 
37 Norway 2005 1,854974 1,44638 1,650677 7,3 23,8 51,3 4,04 25,8 
37 Norway 2004 2,101782 1,453559 1,777671 6,29 28,0 55,3 4,04 25,8 
37 Norway 2003 1,915612 1,292904 1,604258 6,14 28,0 
 
4,73 25,8 
37 Norway 2002 1,903631 1,230194 1,566912 6,27 28,0 
 
8,71 25,8 
38 Peru 2012 
   
5,1 30,0 30 19,2369 
 38 Peru 2011 -0,15086 0,501425 0,175282 5,7 30,0 30 18,6779 
 38 Peru 2010 -0,20748 0,471199 0,131858 7,2 30,0 30 18,9769 48,1 
38 Peru 2009 -0,4098 0,410583 0,000391 7,5 30,0 30 21,0419 49,1 
38 Peru 2008 -0,33251 0,336371 0,001928 8,3 35,0 30 23,6734 49 
38 Peru 2007 -0,47871 0,262218 -0,10825 15,2 35,0 30 22,8556 51,7 
38 Peru 2006 -0,55226 0,141726 -0,20527 12,4 35,0 30 23,9333 50,9 
38 Peru 2005 -0,60044 0,081359 -0,25954 
 
32,0 30 25,5338 51,1 
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38 Peru 2004 -0,46855 0,232334 -0,11811 14,46 32,0 30 24,6746 50,3 
38 Peru 2003 -0,42215 0,176319 -0,12291 
 
32,0 30 21,0157 55,2 
38 Peru 2002 -0,35153 0,026887 -0,16232 14,9 32,0 30 20,7654 55,6 
39 Portugal 2012 
   
6,2 30,0 46,5 
  39 Portugal 2011 0,97448 0,656311 0,815396 5,7 27,0 46,5 
 
38,5 
39 Portugal 2010 1,0365 0,759264 0,897882 5,4 25,0 45,9 
 
38,5 
39 Portugal 2009 1,176544 1,002421 1,089483 
 
25,0 42 
 
38,5 
39 Portugal 2008 1,00956 1,082776 1,046168 
 
25,0 42 
 
38,5 
39 Portugal 2007 0,855501 1,06942 0,962461 7,1 25,0 42 
 
38,5 
39 Portugal 2006 0,83984 1,054102 0,946971 
 
25,0 42 
 
38,5 
39 Portugal 2005 1,063595 1,26638 1,164987 
 
25,0 40 
 
38,5 
39 Portugal 2004 1,09558 1,207917 1,151749 7,3 25,0 40 
 
38,5 
39 Portugal 2003 1,152524 1,225991 1,189257 
 
30,0 40 
 
38,5 
39 Portugal 2002 1,197596 1,271101 1,234349 
 
30,0 40 
 
38,5 
40 Romania 2012 
   
3,9 16,0 16 11,3292 
 40 Romania 2011 -0,21902 0,722387 0,251683 4,6 16,0 16 12,1275 24,72 
40 Romania 2010 -0,15447 0,663038 0,254286 2,1 16,0 16 14,0725 24,2 
40 Romania 2009 -0,25444 0,616921 0,181239 3,4 20,0 16 17,275 30 
40 Romania 2008 -0,26932 0,585751 0,158216 2,1 24,0 16 14,9883 31,2 
40 Romania 2007 -0,27664 0,532167 0,127763 2,5 24,0 16 13,3483 32,1 
40 Romania 2006 -0,18952 0,47537 0,142925 
 
24,0 16 13,9817 32,1 
40 Romania 2005 -0,27359 0,209352 -0,03212 
 
24,0 16 19,6008 31,6 
40 Romania 2004 -0,16741 0,159706 -0,00385 
 
24,0 40 25,6125 31,7 
40 Romania 2003 -0,26871 -0,0723 -0,1705 
 
24,0 40 25,435 31,1 
40 Romania 2002 -0,22909 0,020229 -0,10443 
 
24,0 40 35,425 31,5 
41 Russia 2012 
   
2 20,0 13 9,1 
 41 Russia 2011 -0,40391 -0,35408 -0,379 2,8 20,0 13 8,4583 
 41 Russia 2010 -0,39994 -0,36313 -0,38154 2,8 20,0 13 10,8167 
 41 Russia 2009 -0,35129 -0,35087 -0,35108 2,3 20,0 13 15,3083 40,1 
41 Russia 2008 -0,39631 -0,41718 -0,40674 1,1 20,0 13 12,225 42,3 
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41 Russia 2007 -0,4236 -0,31001 -0,3668 1,7 20,0 13 10,0333 43,7 
41 Russia 2006 -0,49401 -0,43505 -0,46453 1,2 20,0 13 10,425 42,1 
41 Russia 2005 -0,45936 -0,17726 -0,31831 
 
30,0 13 10,6833 37,5 
41 Russia 2004 -0,38199 -0,11162 -0,24681 
 
30,0 13 11,4417 37,1 
41 Russia 2003 -0,39215 -0,18299 -0,28757 
 
30,0 13 12,975 37,3 
41 Russia 2002 -0,34284 -0,26123 -0,30203 1,11 30,0 13 15,7 35,7 
42 Serbia 2012 
    
10,0 15 17,4 
 42 Serbia 2011 -0,14532 0,005612 -0,06985 
 
10,0 15 17,17 
 42 Serbia 2010 -0,10422 -0,04032 -0,07227 
 
10,0 15 17,3 29,6 
42 Serbia 2009 -0,09465 -0,13744 -0,11604 10,1 18,0 15 11,78 27,8 
42 Serbia 2008 -0,18146 -0,29451 -0,23798 9,3 18,0 15 16,1267 28,2 
42 Serbia 2007 -0,21673 -0,34362 -0,28018 5,3 20,0 15 11,13 29,4 
42 Serbia 2006 -0,1998 -0,44975 -0,32477 
 
20,0 10 16,56 29,6 
42 Serbia 2005 
    
20,0 10 16,8317 33,4 
42 Serbia 2004 
    
22,0 10 15,5269 32,9 
42 Serbia 2003 
    
22,0 10 15,4814 32,8 
42 Serbia 2002 
    
22,0 10 19,7146 32,7 
43 Singapore 2012 
   
3,1 17,0 20 5,38 
 43 Singapore 2011 2,156807 1,82529 1,991048 3,3 17,0 20 5,38 42,5 
43 Singapore 2010 2,244724 1,812916 2,02882 
 
17,0 20 5,38 42,5 
43 Singapore 2009 2,265554 1,811709 2,038632 
 
19,0 20 5,38 42,5 
43 Singapore 2008 2,407654 1,90949 2,158572 
 
19,0 20 5,38 42,5 
43 Singapore 2007 2,36062 1,833231 2,096925 
 
19,0 20 5,33 42,5 
43 Singapore 2006 2,176716 1,771681 1,974198 3,4 19,0 20 5,3125 42,5 
43 Singapore 2005 1,996066 1,796511 1,896288 4,7 19,0 21 5,3 42,5 
43 Singapore 2004 2,033281 1,804619 1,91895 3,88 19,0 22 5,3 42,5 
43 Singapore 2003 1,960539 1,825609 1,893074 1,78 25,0 
 
5,3067 42,5 
43 Singapore 2002 1,851883 1,939 1,895442 3,12 25,0 
 
5,3458 42,5 
44 Slovenia 2012 
   
5,8 20,0 41 
  44 Slovenia 2011 0,985216 0,632536 0,808876 4,8 20,0 41 
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44 Slovenia 2010 1,030799 0,701761 0,86628 4,9 20,0 41 
  44 Slovenia 2009 1,156147 0,870037 1,013092 5,6 21,0 41 5,94 
 44 Slovenia 2008 1,191467 0,824284 1,007876 5,6 22,0 41 6,6583 
 44 Slovenia 2007 0,942624 0,797187 0,869905 4,6 23,0 41 5,9125 
 44 Slovenia 2006 0,983769 0,775812 0,87979 4,4 25,0 50 7,4083 
 44 Slovenia 2005 0,919416 0,832994 0,876205 6,3 25,0 50 7,8 
 44 Slovenia 2004 0,970801 0,856788 0,913795 4,2 25,0 50 8,65 31,2 
44 Slovenia 2003 1,071957 0,867417 0,969687 5,4 25,0 50 10,75 30,8 
44 Slovenia 2002 0,897989 0,864955 0,881472 6,7 25,0 50 13,1708 29,2 
45 South Africa 2012 
   
2,3 34,6 40 8,75 
 45 South Africa 2011 0,368881 0,436321 0,402601 2,3 34,6 40 9 
 45 South Africa 2010 0,382441 0,390876 0,386659 2,1 34,6 40 9,8333 
 45 South Africa 2009 0,462595 0,435232 0,448913 1,4 30,0 40 11,7083 63,1 
45 South Africa 2008 0,534599 0,4874 0,511 2,3 30,0 40 15,125 
 45 South Africa 2007 0,506743 0,518362 0,512552 
 
32,5 40 13,1667 
 45 South Africa 2006 0,518109 0,701543 0,609826 1,7 35,0 40 11,1667 67,4 
45 South Africa 2005 0,644622 0,671809 0,658216 1,3 35,0 40 10,625 
 45 South Africa 2004 0,664746 0,665314 0,66503 1,44 35,0 40 11,2917 
 45 South Africa 2003 0,683104 0,778381 0,730743 1,08 35,0 40 14,9583 
 45 South Africa 2002 0,637907 0,629977 0,633942 1,12 35,0 40 15,75 57,8 
46 Spain 2012 
   
8,5 30,0 52 
  46 Spain 2011 1,021439 1,092676 1,057057 8,9 30,0 45 
 
34,7 
46 Spain 2010 0,981735 1,162015 1,071875 7,7 30,0 43 
 
34,7 
46 Spain 2009 0,926783 1,17888 1,052832 6,4 30,0 43 
 
34,7 
46 Spain 2008 0,885733 1,227821 1,056777 9,1 30,0 43 
 
34,7 
46 Spain 2007 0,965916 1,201784 1,08385 6,4 32,5 43 
 
34,7 
46 Spain 2006 0,871598 1,145553 1,008576 5,4 35,0 45 
 
34,7 
46 Spain 2005 1,488634 1,294576 1,391605 7,7 35,0 45 
 
34,7 
46 Spain 2004 1,373442 1,329381 1,351411 7,79 35,0 45 
 
34,7 
46 Spain 2003 1,89883 1,311911 1,60537 4,78 35,0 45 
 
34,7 
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46 Spain 2002 1,855474 1,353447 1,60446 8,39 35,0 45 4,3058 34,7 
47 Sweden 2012 
   
5,2 26,3 56,6 
  47 Sweden 2011 1,961028 1,835567 1,898298 7 26,3 56,6 
 
25 
47 Sweden 2010 2,000982 1,709628 1,855305 6,4 26,3 56,6 
 
25 
47 Sweden 2009 2,039521 1,707027 1,873274 
 
26,3 56,7 
 
25 
47 Sweden 2008 1,906695 1,666722 1,786709 
 
28,0 56,7 
 
25 
47 Sweden 2007 1,991916 1,598337 1,795126 4,7 28,0 56,8 
 
25 
47 Sweden 2006 1,830822 1,461904 1,646363 5 28,0 56,8 3,314 25 
47 Sweden 2005 1,889506 1,51486 1,702183 6,3 28,0 56,8 4 25 
47 Sweden 2004 2,144012 1,690708 1,91736 6,03 28,0 56,7 4,79 25 
47 Sweden 2003 2,093538 1,619816 1,856677 5,36 28,0 56,7 5,64 25 
47 Sweden 2002 2,033928 1,616635 1,825282 6,81 28,0 56,7 5,55 25 
48 Switzerland 2012 
   
8,4 6,7 40 2,6883 
 48 Switzerland 2011 1,89115 1,637395 1,764272 10,1 6,7 40 2,7183 33,7 
48 Switzerland 2010 1,909908 1,646252 1,77808 8,7 6,7 40 2,7333 33,7 
48 Switzerland 2009 1,986132 1,573689 1,77991 8,4 6,7 40 2,7508 33,7 
48 Switzerland 2008 2,019682 1,589183 1,804432 
 
6,7 40 3,3425 33,7 
48 Switzerland 2007 2,030659 1,6529 1,841779 6,6 6,7 40,4 3,15 33,7 
48 Switzerland 2006 2,025148 1,505749 1,765448 
 
6,7 40,4 3,0317 33,7 
48 Switzerland 2005 1,887899 1,538064 1,712981 9,7 6,7 40,4 3,1192 33,7 
48 Switzerland 2004 2,217569 1,666198 1,941883 
 
6,5 40,4 3,195 33,7 
48 Switzerland 2003 1,805266 1,708917 1,757092 7,3 6,5 40,4 3,2692 33,7 
48 Switzerland 2002 2,023317 1,777607 1,900462 6,8 6,4 40,4 3,9317 33,7 
49 Thailand 2012 
   
29,7 23,0 37 7,0975 
 49 Thailand 2011 0,102637 0,236564 0,169601 30,1 30,0 37 6,9142 
 49 Thailand 2010 0,084831 0,202341 0,143586 
 
30,0 37 5,935 39,4 
49 Thailand 2009 0,170814 0,250963 0,210889 
 
30,0 37 5,9625 40 
49 Thailand 2008 0,245686 0,226236 0,235961 
 
30,0 37 7,0417 40,5 
49 Thailand 2007 0,358574 0,135772 0,247173 21,4 30,0 37 7,05 
 49 Thailand 2006 0,387151 0,242991 0,315071 17,4 35,0 37 7,3542 42,4 
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49 Thailand 2005 0,429161 0,455116 0,442139 14,1 35,0 37 5,7917 
 49 Thailand 2004 0,362202 0,251331 0,306766 
 
33,0 37 5,5 
 49 Thailand 2003 0,376206 0,370559 0,373383 
 
30,0 37 5,9375 
 49 Thailand 2002 0,29319 0,164903 0,229046 13,3 30,0 37 6,875 42 
50 Turkey 2012 
   
8,7 20,0 35 
  50 Turkey 2011 0,409213 0,422114 0,415664 8 20,0 35 
  50 Turkey 2010 0,353137 0,325334 0,339235 10,7 20,0 35 
 
40 
50 Turkey 2009 0,33965 0,315243 0,327447 
 
20,0 35 
 
38,7 
50 Turkey 2008 0,255512 0,270078 0,262795 4,8 20,0 35 
 
39 
50 Turkey 2007 0,29408 0,323926 0,309003 5,5 20,0 35 
 
39,3 
50 Turkey 2006 0,155368 0,294886 0,225127 11,4 20,0 35 
 
40,3 
50 Turkey 2005 0,162724 0,272451 0,217588 
 
30,0 35 
 
42,6 
50 Turkey 2004 0,043412 0,073972 0,058692 
 
33,0 40 
 
42,7 
50 Turkey 2003 0,039336 0,030959 0,035147 
 
30,0 40 
 
43,4 
50 Turkey 2002 0,044635 0,087173 0,065904 
 
33,0 40 
 
42,7 
51 United Arab Emirates 2012 
    
55,0 0 
  51 United Arab Emirates 2011 0,951929 0,399546 0,675737 2,7 55,0 0 
  51 United Arab Emirates 2010 0,78251 0,369494 0,576002 
 
55,0 0 
  51 United Arab Emirates 2009 0,89032 0,497173 0,693747 5,7 28,0 0 
  51 United Arab Emirates 2008 0,885724 0,606413 0,746068 
 
28,0 0 
  51 United Arab Emirates 2007 0,92685 0,646702 0,786776 3,4 30,0 0 
  51 United Arab Emirates 2006 0,914692 0,652641 0,783667 1,4 30,0 0 
  51 United Arab Emirates 2005 0,754226 0,687998 0,721112 
 
30,0 0 
  51 United Arab Emirates 2004 0,755248 0,828556 0,791902 
 
30,0 0 
  51 United Arab Emirates 2003 0,562495 0,658268 0,610382 
 
30,0 0 
  51 United Arab Emirates 2002 0,821629 1,116117 0,968873 
 
30,0 0 8,0525 
 52 United Kingdom 2012 
   
6,2 24,0 50 5 
 52 United Kingdom 2011 1,547938 1,619811 1,583875 7,2 26,0 50 5 36 
52 United Kingdom 2010 1,558267 1,746126 1,652197 6,4 28,0 50 5 36 
52 United Kingdom 2009 1,504105 1,601857 1,552981 6,1 28,0 40 6,25 36 
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52 United Kingdom 2008 1,635262 1,778 1,706631 6 28,0 40 4,625 36 
52 United Kingdom 2007 1,655768 1,858771 1,757269 5,1 30,0 40 5,5242 36 
52 United Kingdom 2006 1,718414 1,849638 1,784026 5,4 30,0 40 4,6458 36 
52 United Kingdom 2005 1,747057 1,619856 1,683456 5,1 30,0 40 4,6458 36 
52 United Kingdom 2004 1,899971 1,758722 1,829347 5,11 30,0 40 4,3958 36 
52 United Kingdom 2003 1,831382 1,665951 1,748667 5,78 30,0 40 3,6875 36 
52 United Kingdom 2002 1,849087 1,741349 1,795218 5,5 30,0 40 4 36 
53 United States 2012 
   
8,6 32,8 35 3,25 
 53 United States 2011 1,406131 1,485022 1,445576 9,1 32,7 35 3,25 40,8 
53 United States 2010 1,439457 1,44881 1,444133 7,7 32,7 35 3,25 40,8 
53 United States 2009 1,397449 1,40493 1,40119 5,9 32,8 35 3,25 40,8 
53 United States 2008 1,535166 1,533041 1,534104 8,3 32,7 35 5,0875 40,8 
53 United States 2007 1,590377 1,491702 1,54104 5 32,7 35 8,05 40,8 
53 United States 2006 1,556301 1,641529 1,598915 5,4 32,7 35 7,9575 40,8 
53 United States 2005 1,573012 1,613144 1,593078 4,7 32,7 35 6,1892 40,8 
53 United States 2004 1,799928 1,5852 1,692564 5,45 32,7 35 4,34 40,8 
53 United States 2003 1,60633 1,576541 1,591435 5,39 32,7 35 4,1225 40,8 
53 United States 2002 1,696281 1,580929 1,638605 5,69 32,7 35 4,675 40,8 
54 Uruguay 2012 
   
5 25,0 25 11,1992 
 54 Uruguay 2011 0,576409 0,409251 0,49283 5,9 25,0 25 9,7818 
 54 Uruguay 2010 0,653863 0,365703 0,509783 7,2 25,0 25 10,3262 45,3 
54 Uruguay 2009 0,608045 0,349421 0,478733 5,9 34,0 25 15,2848 46,3 
54 Uruguay 2008 0,504881 0,243775 0,374328 7,9 34,0 25 12,4476 46,3 
54 Uruguay 2007 0,504309 0,201208 0,352759 6,6 34,0 25 8,9397 47,6 
54 Uruguay 2006 0,393929 0,292773 0,343351 6,9 34,0 0 9,25 47,2 
54 Uruguay 2005 0,505115 0,344607 0,424861 
 
34,0 0 13,6095 45,9 
54 Uruguay 2004 0,347946 0,267037 0,307491 
 
34,0 0 23,6791 47,1 
54 Uruguay 2003 0,504237 0,276821 0,390529 
 
34,0 0 58,941 46,2 
54 Uruguay 2002 0,581859 0,500367 0,541113 
 
34,0 0 118,3799 46,7 
55 Venezuela 2012 
    
34,0 34 16,38 
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55 Venezuela 2011 -1,10316 -1,49232 -1,29774 1,6 34,0 34 17,15 
 55 Venezuela 2010 -1,0163 -1,58939 -1,30284 
 
34,0 34 18,3475 
 55 Venezuela 2009 -0,89116 -1,56007 -1,22561 6,5 25,0 34 19,8933 
 55 Venezuela 2008 -1,0551 -1,33058 -1,19284 
 
28,0 34 22,3808 
 55 Venezuela 2007 -1,01086 -1,36828 -1,18957 5,4 28,0 34 17,105 
 55 Venezuela 2006 -0,99869 -1,12728 -1,06298 
 
28,0 34 15,4767 44,8 
55 Venezuela 2005 -0,89763 -1,12871 -1,01317 8,6 28,0 34 16,8092 49,5 
55 Venezuela 2004 -1,01768 -1,08206 -1,04987 
 
28,0 34 18,4967 47,5 
55 Venezuela 2003 -0,95112 -1,03102 -0,99107 9,6 32,0 34 25,1933 48,1 
55 Venezuela 2002 -1,00789 -0,647 -0,82744 
 
32,0 34 36,5775 49 
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Appendix 3. Constants of Simulation Experiments 
 
q(θ) (matching function) 0,5 
θ (labour market tightness) 1,5 
r (a discount factor) 0,2 
q (productivity of education) 10 
p (productivity advantage in the regular sector) 2 
β (a fixed share of surplus) 0,3 
 
 
 (a share of taxes dedicated to the sphere of education) 0,43 
 
 
 (a share of taxes dedicated to the sphere of education) 0,57 
   (initial costs of posting a vacancy) 1 
   (initial costs of education) 1 
 
 
